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**Technical Secretariat**

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**NOTE BY THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT**

**INTERIM REPORT OF THE OPCW FACT-FINDING MISSION IN SYRIA  
REGARDING THE INCIDENTS DESCRIBED IN COMMUNICATIONS  
FROM THE DEPUTY MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND EXPATRIATES  
AND HEAD OF THE NATIONAL AUTHORITY OF THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC  
FROM 15 DECEMBER 2014 TO 15 JUNE 2015**



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>1.</b>	<b>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>2.</b>	<b>THE FACT-FINDING MISSION: BACKGROUND INFORMATION .....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>3.</b>	<b>THE FACT-FINDING MISSION: PRE-DEPLOYMENT PHASE.....</b>	<b>6</b>
	<b>FIRST DEPLOYMENT .....</b>	<b>7</b>
	ADVANCE TEAM ACTIVITIES .....	7
	THE MAIN BODY OF THE FACT-FINDING MISSION.....	8
	INVESTIGATION ACTIVITIES .....	8
	<b>SECOND DEPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES .....</b>	<b>16</b>
	INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES .....	18
	INTERVIEWS: METHODOLOGY AND ACTIVITIES.....	20
	REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND SERVICES: METHODOLOGY AND ACTIVITIES .....	26
	<b>DATA ANALYSIS .....</b>	<b>30</b>
	DATA ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY EMPLOYED BY THE FACT-FINDING MISSION .....	30
	ANALYSIS OF THE ALLEGED INCIDENT IN JOBER ON 29 AUGUST 2014 ...	31
	ANALYSIS OF THE ALLEGED INCIDENT IN AL-MALIHA ON 16 APRIL 2014.....	35
	ANALYSIS OF THE ALLEGED INCIDENT IN AL-MALIHA ON 11 JULY 2014 .....	35
	ANALYSIS OF THE ALLEGED INCIDENT IN AL-KABBAS ON 10 SEPTEMBER 2014.....	35
	ANALYSIS OF THE ALLEGED INCIDENT IN NUBEL AND AL-ZAHRAA ON 8 JANUARY 2015 .....	35
	ANALYSIS OF THE ALLEGED INCIDENT IN DARAYYA ON 15 FEBRUARY 2015.....	35
<b>4.</b>	<b>CONCLUSIONS.....</b>	<b>35</b>
	<b>FACT-FINDING MISSION: MANDATED AIMS.....</b>	<b>35</b>
	FACT-FINDING MISSION: OPERATIONAL INSTRUCTIONS .....	37
<b>5.</b>	<b>SIGNATURE .....</b>	<b>40</b>

## TABLE OF ANNEXES

Annex 1:	MEDICAL REPORT ON THE ALLEGED USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN THE JOBER AREA OF DAMASCUS, SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC, ON THE 29TH OF AUGUST 2014.....	41
Annex 2:	EXTRACT FROM INTERVIEW ANALYSIS (JOBBER INCIDENT 29 AUGUST 2014) (English only).....	49
Annex 3:	LIST OF MATERIALS GATHERED DURING THE INTERVIEW PROCESS (English only).....	50
Annex 4:	ONE IMAGE FROM THOSE PROVIDED BY Syrian Arab Republic RELATED TO THE ALLEGED INCIDENT IN JOBER ON 29 AUGUST 2014 (English only).....	54
Annex 5:	ADMINISTRATIVE DATA (English only).....	55
Annex 6:	SEQUENCE OF EVENTS – DATES AND TIMES (English only).....	57
Annex 7:	LIST OF OTHER DOCUMENTS PROVIDED BY THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC (English only).....	58
Annex 8:	LIST OF REFERENCES (English only).....	59

## **1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

- 1.1 At its Forty-Eighth Meeting, the OPCW Executive Council adopted a decision entitled “Reports of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria” (EC-M-48/DEC.1, dated 4 February 2015) in which, inter alia, it requested the Director-General to provide information on the progress of the Fact-Finding Mission (“FFM”) and specific plans, schedules and their implementation to the Council at its next regular session. In response to this request, the Technical Secretariat (“Secretariat”) submitted a Note to address the future activities of the OPCW FFM (S/1255/2015, dated 10 March 2015).
- 1.2 The Secretariat received a note verbale from the Syrian Arab Republic (Note Verbale 150) providing information about incidents involving the alleged use of chemicals as a weapon, particularly chlorine. In addition, the Permanent Representation of the Syrian Arab Republic later submitted Notes Verbales 41, 43, and 47 detailing other incidents that allegedly involved the use of chemicals as a weapon. In total, the notes referred to 26 incidents and 432 casualties.
- 1.3 Due to the seriousness of the allegations, the Director-General dispatched a team to collect the facts pertinent to the alleged chemical incidents as reported in the referenced notes verbales. The FFM deployed on 1 June, 1 August, and 13 October 2015. The team was composed of OPCW inspectors, consulting medical doctors, and interpreters. During the deployment, the FFM conducted its investigation by collecting testimonies, reviewing documents and information provided by the Syrian authorities, and by visiting certain locations deemed of interest in the Damascus area. In total, the team conducted approximately 75 interviews in relation to 6 alleged incidents.
- 1.4 At the time at which this interim report was issued, the FFM had completed the analysis of the alleged incident in Jober on 29 August 2014. The other incidents under investigation are pending final analysis and will be included in the final report.
- 1.5 Regarding the aforementioned alleged incident in Jober, the FFM is of the opinion that it would have been able to be more precise in its findings if further objective evidence complementing what was provided by the Syrian National Authority had been made available. The team was not able to obtain hard evidence related to this incident, either because it was unavailable or because it was not generated in the first place. The lack of hard evidence precluded the FFM from gathering further facts in a definitive way. Therefore, based only on the interviews carried out and documents reviewed, the FFM is of the view that those affected in the alleged incident may have been exposed to some type of non-persistent, irritating airborne substance, following the surface impact of two launched objects.
- 1.6 However, based on the evidence presented by the Syrian National Authority, the medical records that were reviewed, and the prevailing narrative of all of the interviews, the FFM cannot confidently determine whether or not a chemical was used as a weapon. Furthermore, the FFM is of the view that while the general clinical presentation of those affected in the incident is consistent with brief exposure to any number of chemicals or environmental insults, the visual and olfactory description of the potential irritant does not clearly indicate any specific chemical.

## 2. THE FACT-FINDING MISSION: BACKGROUND INFORMATION

- 2.1 At its Forty-Eighth Meeting, the OPCW Executive Council adopted a decision entitled “Reports of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria” (EC-M-48/DEC.1, dated 4 February 2015) in which, inter alia, it requested the Director-General General to provide information on the progress of the FFM and specific plans, schedules and their implementation to the Council at its next regular session..
- 2.2 In response to this request, the Secretariat submitted a Note to address the future activities of the FFM (S/1255/2015, dated 10 March 2015). This Note stated that the Secretariat received a note verbale from the Syrian Arab Republic (reference number 150, dated 15 December 2014, hereinafter “Note Verbale 150”) providing information about incidents involving the alleged use of chemicals as a weapon, particularly chlorine.
- 2.3 Note Verbale 150 contained a report by the Military Medical Services of the General Command of the Army and the Armed Forces of the Syrian Arab Republic providing information on cases of injuries sustained by soldiers of the Syrian Arab Republic in a number of locations as a result of the use of chlorine by opposition groups. The report listed alleged chemical incidents, with the locations of alleged instances of exposure, casualty names, ranks, duty stations, reported symptoms, medical assistance received, and conditions after discharge. The table below summarises the data contained in the medical report.

**TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF THE ALLEGED INCIDENTS IN NOTE VERBALE 150:**

No.	Date	Location	Number of Casualties	Type of Casualty
1.	16/04/2014	Al-Maliha	5	Military personnel
2.	16/04/2014	Jober	10	Military personnel
3.	02/07/2014	Al-Maliha	5	Military personnel
4.	08/07/2014	Al-Maliha	7	Military personnel
5.	11/07/2014	Al-Maliha	6	Military personnel
6.	15/08/2014	Darayya	8	Military personnel
7.	29/08/2014	Jober	33	Military personnel
8.	04/09/2014	Jober	5	Military personnel
9.	10/09/2014	Al-Kabbas	6	Military personnel
10.	18/09/2014	Al-Kabbas	7	Military personnel
<b>Total</b>	<b>10 separate incidents</b>	<b>4 locations (neighbourhoods in the Damascus area)</b>	<b>92 casualties</b>	<b>Military personnel</b>

- 2.4 In addition, Note Verbale 150 made reference to an attack where it is alleged that toxic gases were employed against Syrian Arab Army soldiers on 22 December 2012.

According to the note verbale, seven fatalities occurred as a result of exposure to a yellow gas. These fatalities happened within one hour of exposure.

- 2.5 Upon receipt of Note Verbale 150, and due to the severity of the allegations, the Director-General resolved to dispatch a team to the Syrian Arab Republic to collect the facts pertinent to alleged chemical incidents as reported in Note Verbale 150. Correspondence between the Director-General and the Syrian Arab Republic followed, addressing the launch of a FFM. Requests for clarification made by the Syrian Arab Republic in this regard were responded to.
- 2.6 The Terms of Reference for the OPCW FFM in Syria were agreed upon through correspondence (S/1255/2015, dated 10 March 2015). Further correspondence between the Director-General and the authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic took place between March and April 2015 in order to clarify points about the future work of the FFM and its terms of reference.

### **3. THE FACT-FINDING MISSION: PRE-DEPLOYMENT PHASE**

- 3.1 The Director-General appointed the mission leader for the FFM on 24 March 2015. Next, a team of inspectors was selected based not only on professional background, technical expertise, and skills, but also with due regard for the geographic distribution of nationalities of the team's membership. Once the team was assembled, preparations for deployment commenced. These preparations included logistics, administration, health, safety and security assessment and planning. Additionally, the team underwent a number of training sessions to refresh knowledge and practice on topics such as conducting interviews, forensic techniques, confidentiality procedures, and explosive remnants of war.
- 3.2 Correspondence between the Syrian Arab Republic and the Secretariat took place in April and May 2015. In these letters, the Secretariat detailed the team membership, made a request for the deployment of an Advance Team to liaise with the relevant authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic, and submitted a preliminary list of requests for information and services to be provided to the FFM in Damascus. Among other things, these requests addressed initial requirements deemed appropriate by the FFM for its investigation and were subject to possible changes during the FFM.
- 3.3 A list of requests for information and services to be provided by the authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic to the FFM was sent in correspondence (L/ODG/198036/15, dated 21 May 2015). The list made reference to the incidents involving the alleged use of chemical weapons described in Note Verbale 150. This list is detailed in Table 3 of this report.
- 3.4 The Syrian Arab Republic sent a reply to the Secretariat on 21 May 2015, in which it welcomed the deployment of the FFM to Syria, despite providing some suggested changes to the previously agreed terms of reference (Note Verbale 37). This was followed by a series of meetings in The Hague and Damascus. Once negotiations and requests for clarification were concluded, the FFM received authorisation to deploy.
- 3.5 It was agreed that an Advance Team would arrive in the Syrian Arab Republic on 25 May 2015, whilst the main body of the FFM would arrive on 1 June 2015. The purpose of the Advance Team was to meet with the relevant authorities from the

Syrian Arab Republic in Damascus in order to discuss how to best proceed with the FFM's work. The main body of the team would then carry out the bulk of investigative activities upon arrival.

## **FIRST DEPLOYMENT**

### **Advance Team Activities**

- 3.6 The Advance Team was comprised of the mission team leader and three team members who carried out the described preparatory activities from 25 May 2015 to 29 May 2015. The Advance Team provided a copy of its mandate (in English and Arabic) to the authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic at their first meeting and continued to finalise operational details during follow-up meetings over subsequent days.
- 3.7 A series of meetings with the authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic took place on the following days. During these meetings, the Advance Team offered explanations to the authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic on the methodology intended to be used by the FFM. The methodology would include interviews, the review of records and evidence (as per the request sent in correspondence L/ODG/198036/15, dated 21 May 2015), and potential field visits. These field visits would only be performed if deemed necessary and safe. The FFM Advance Team offered clarification on the aforementioned list of records required for the investigation. The necessary arrangements for the interviews were also discussed, such as the number of interviews per day, locations, and potential interviewees.
- 3.8 The Advance Team indicated that the FFM should maintain full discretion over the selection of potential interviewees. The authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic replied that such unhindered access would not be possible due to operational conflict-related constraints affecting, among other things, transport and security. With regard to these constraints, an agreement was reached between the authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic and the FFM to focus initially on the incident alleged to have taken place on 29 August 2014 in Jobar. The fact that this particular event involved the highest number of casualties from among all of the alleged incidents described in Note Verbale 150 served as the basis for this agreement. Accordingly, the authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic proposed to make relevant witnesses available to the FFM. The witnesses included casualties, first responders, ambulance drivers, and medical personnel involved in said alleged incident.
- 3.9 The FFM requested a visit to Martyr Youssef Al-Adhma Hospital (hereinafter "Hospital 601"), which was described in Note Verbale 150 as the location where the casualties of the alleged incidents were treated. This facility, located in the western part of Damascus, provides treatment for military and civilian personnel.
- 3.10 Apart from possibly identifying suitable witnesses from amongst the staff and patient registers, the FFM aimed to learn about the hospital facilities and record-keeping systems. Additionally, the FFM aimed to obtain information on the medical treatment provided to the alleged victims and determine the availability of biomedical samples.
- 3.11 During the visit to Hospital 601 on 27 May 2015, the FFM received a tour of hospital facilities. This tour included the ambulance entrance area, an external

decontamination area equipped with showers, the triage area, the entrance to the emergency department, resuscitation room, and a typical multi-bed ward room. The team was provided with a sample of patient logs kept by the hospital, including a log-book of clinical admissions making mention of patients listed in Note Verbale 150. Furthermore, the hospital liaison officer gave verbal confirmation to the FFM that all patients associated with Note Verbale 150 were treated there.

- 3.12 At the end of the visit, the Advance Team indicated which hospital records it would like to review and identified potential hospital staff to be interviewed as witnesses of the alleged incidents. The list of additional records requested from the authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic can be found in Table 4 of this report.
- 3.13 During the initial meetings with the FFM Advance Team, the authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic indicated that there had been other relevant incidents that were not included in Note Verbale 150. The team received a copy of correspondence sent by the Syrian Arab Republic to the Director-General and the Secretariat (Note Verbale 41, dated 29 May 2015), where details of alleged incidents involving chlorine were provided. The authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic requested that these alleged incidents be included in the scope of the FFM. However, the team indicated that a new mandate including these new allegations would have to be issued for this purpose. In addition to Note Verbale 41, the Syrian Arab Republic submitted Note Verbale 43 (dated 3 June 2015) and Note Verbale 47 (dated 15 June 2015) to the Secretariat detailing incidents that were not included in Note Verbale 150.
- 3.14 Due to the significance of these allegations, the Director-General again decided to dispatch the FFM to the Syrian Arab Republic to collect facts pertinent to the alleged chemical incidents as reported. The second deployment of the FFM eventually occurred between 1 August 2015 and 16 August 2015 and is described in this report under the heading ‘Second Deployment Activities’.

### **The Main Body of the Fact-Finding Mission**

- 3.15 The main body of the first deployment of this FFM was composed of the deputy mission leader, three inspectors, two medical doctors, and three interpreters. The team deployed on 29 May 2015 and joined the Advance Team in Damascus. Upon arrival, the main body was briefed by the Advance Team on the status of activities to date and the general outline for mission activities going forward. The full FFM team was formally introduced to the Syrian Arab Republic contingent. Final preparations for the interview process were then completed.

### **Investigation Activities**

- 3.16 As described in paragraph 3.8, the FFM began investigative activities focusing on the alleged incident of 29 August 2014 in the Jobber neighbourhood of Damascus. The following sections describe the related activities carried out by the FFM.

#### Interviews: Methodology and Activities

- 3.17 The FFM planned the order of the interviews based on the availability of the witnesses, as well as on how witnesses were related to the alleged incident. Priority

was given to collecting testimonies from casualties involved in the alleged incident, followed by the testimonies of medical doctors, nurses, and ambulance drivers.

- 3.18 The interviews were conducted by two sub-teams, each composed of one or more inspectors, one medical doctor, and one interpreter. The interview process followed applicable procedures established in relevant OPCW working instructions and was consistent with the specialised training mentioned in paragraph 3.1. Evidence obtained in the interviews was also processed according to applicable OPCW working instructions and specialised training.
- 3.19 The interview teams planned interviews based on information about the interviewee's background, the type of witness, his or her role in the incident, and information provided by other witnesses, among other factors. A package containing interview packs and evidence management packs was prepared for each interview. Each interview pack contained protocol forms, consent forms, note pages, investigative lead forms, and a folder contents list. Each evidence management pack contained receipts for evidence, drawing space forms, SD cards for video, photo and audio recordings, chain-of-custody forms for e-storage devices, a list of evidence on e-storage devices, envelopes for evidence, and a folder contents list.
- 3.20 The testimonies were collected in hotel accommodations set up as interview rooms. At the hotel where the interviews were being conducted, each interviewee was brought forth by the Syrian Arab Republic contingent and escorted to the interview room. There, each interviewee was greeted upon arrival by the interview team and introduced to each team member. The team member leading each interview provided an explanation about the interview process, confidentiality procedures, consent forms, procedures for protected witnesses, and the methods employed for recording the interview. The interviewees were informed upon entering the room that video and audio devices in place were not yet recording, and that no statements would be recorded until the interviewee gave informed consent to record. If and when an interviewee did not consent to be recorded by an audio or video device, a written statement was produced via the team interpreter.
- 3.21 Video and audio recordings, written statements, and sketches produced by the interviewees were documented as evidence and secured in the evidence management packs described above.
- 3.22 On 31 May 2015, the authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic submitted a list of 16 casualties related to the alleged incident of 29 August 2014 in the Jober neighbourhood. According to the Syrian Arab Republic, the named individuals were affected in the described incident and received medical treatment. The authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic also submitted another list containing the names of six doctors and eleven nurses who provided treatment to the patients of said alleged incident.
- 3.23 The interviews started on 1 June 2015 with the collection of testimonies from casualties affected by the alleged incident. On 3 June 2015, after a number of interviews with casualties and a review of the translated medical records, the FFM selected four names from the list of doctors and nurses who provided treatment to the casualties. In addition, the FFM requested the authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic

to make available field medical staff who had treated patients involved in the incident of 29 August 2014 before their transfer to Hospital 601. The authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic responded verbally to the FFM that they would look into the matter and make the relevant staff available to be interviewed.

3.24 Table 2 provides the list of interviews conducted and the reasoning for selecting each individual for interview.


**TABLE 2: INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED IN RELATION TO THE ALLEGED INCIDENT IN JOBER ON 29 AUGUST 2014**

<b>S/N</b>	<b>Rank or Occupation of interviewed individual</b>	<b>Proximity to Alleged incident in FFM Mandate</b>	<b>Date of interview</b>
1.	Military Personnel	Casualty of the alleged incident	1 June 2015
2.	Military Personnel	Casualty of the alleged incident	1 June 2015
3.	Military Personnel	Casualty of the alleged incident	1 June 2015
4.	Military Personnel	Casualty of the alleged incident	1 June 2015
5.	Military Personnel	Casualty of the alleged incident	1 June 2015
6.	Military Personnel	Casualty of the alleged incident	1 June 2015
7.	Military Personnel	Casualty of the alleged incident	1 June 2015
8.	Military Personnel	Casualty of the alleged incident	1 June 2015
9.	Military Personnel	Casualty of the alleged incident	1 June 2015
10.	Military Personnel	Casualty of the alleged incident	2 June 2015
11.	Military Personnel	Casualty of the alleged incident	2 June 2015
12.	Military Personnel	Casualty of the alleged incident	2 June 2015
13.	Military Personnel	Casualty of the alleged incident	2 June 2015
14.	Military Personnel	Casualty of the alleged incident	2 June 2015
15.	Military Personnel	Casualty of the alleged incident	2 June 2015
16.	Military Personnel	Casualty of the alleged incident	2 June 2015
17.	Military Personnel	Casualty of the alleged incident	2 June 2015
18.	Military Personnel	Casualty of the alleged incident	2 June 2015
19.	Military Personnel	Casualty of the alleged incident	3 June 2015
20.	Military Personnel	Casualty of the alleged incident	3 June 2015
21.	Military Personnel	Casualty of the alleged incident	3 June 2015
22.	Military Personnel	Casualty of the alleged incident	3 June 2015
23.	Medical staff	General surgeon from Martyr Youssef Al-Adhma Hospital, ER department	6 June 2015
24.	Medical staff	Medical doctor from Martyr Youssef Al-Adhma Hospital	6 June 2015
25.	Medical staff	Nurse from Martyr Youssef Al-Adhma Hospital	6 June 2015
26.	Medical staff	Medical doctor from Martyr Youssef Al-Adhma Hospital	6 June 2015
27.	Medical staff	Medical doctor from Martyr Youssef Al-Adhma Hospital	6 June 2015
28.	Medical staff	Medical doctor from Martyr Youssef Al-Adhma Hospital	6 June 2015


S/N	Rank or Occupation of interviewed individual	Proximity to Alleged incident in FFM Mandate	Date of interview
29.	Medical staff	Field nurse in the Syrian Arab army	7 June 2015
30.	Medical staff	Ambulance driver	7 June 2015
31.	Medical staff	Medical doctor from Martyr Youssef Al-Adhma Hospital	7 June 2015
32.	Medical staff	Medical doctor from Martyr Youssef Al-Adhma Hospital	7 June 2015
33.	Medical staff	Nurse from Martyr Youssef Al-Adhma Hospital	7 June 2015
34.	Medical staff	Nurse from Martyr Youssef Al-Adhma Hospital	7 June 2015
35.	Medical staff	Nurse from Martyr Youssef Al-Adhma Hospital	8 June 2015
36.	Medical staff	Resident medical doctor from Martyr Youssef Al-Adhma Hospital	8 June 2015
37.	Medical staff	Medical assistant from Martyr Youssef Al-Adhma Hospital	8 June 2015
38.	Medical staff	Nurse from Martyr Youssef Al-Adhma Hospital	8 June 2015

3.25 The gender and age distribution of the casualties and medical staff interviewed by the FFM are shown in Charts 1 and 2 below. One interviewee refused to provide his age (DNP).

**CHART 1: AGE DISTRIBUTION AMONG INTERVIEWEES**



**CHART 2: GENDER DISTRIBUTION AMONG INTERVIEWEES**



3.26 All of the females interviewed were medical staff.

3.27 The analysis of the information gathered during the interviews is described in this report under the heading ‘Data Analysis Methodology Employed by the FFM’.

Requests for Information and Services: Methodology and Activities

3.28 The FFM reviewed the information available in Note Verbale 150 on the incidents involving the alleged use of toxic chemicals and produced a preliminary list of requests for information and services, with a view to clarify and identify facts related to the incidents.

3.29 This request for information and services to be provided to the FFM was submitted in correspondence to the authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic (L/ODG/198036/15, dated 21 May 2015). The correspondence suggested that the requests were provided to the FFM at the time of its deployment to Damascus. The table below presents the list of requests made by the FFM, the date on which they were provided, and comments detailing what was provided.

**TABLE 3: LIST OF REQUESTS MADE BY THE FACT-FINDING MISSION TO THE AUTHORITIES OF THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC, DATED 21 MAY 2015**

No.	Description of Information / Service	Date provided	Comments
1.	Confirmed locations, including exact map coordinates and mapping of all of the reported incidents described in the letter.	See table 4	This was provided at a later date per a new request.

No.	Description of Information / Service	Date provided	Comments
2.	Contemporaneous incident reports (and when appropriate copies thereof) from all parties involved, on all of the incidents described in point 1 above.	Not provided	—
3.	Access to and when appropriate copies of any medical records, patient history forms, treatment plans, x-ray images, prescription forms, discharge forms, or any other relevant information deemed necessary by the FFM for all of the casualties named in the letter.	31/05/2015, 02/06/2015, and 08/06/2015	Patient admission, examination and treatment records in the Emergency Department of Hospital 601 relating to the alleged incident in Jober on 29/08/2014. The information was used to compile the medical report.
4.	If safe to do so, a visit to the Martyr Youssef Al-Adhma Hospital (Hospital 601), Damascus, to acquaint the team with the layout of the hospital, including visits to any areas where the casualties listed in the letter were treated, the hospital records repository, and the record-keeping system.	25/05/15	The FFM Advance Team used this visit to become familiar with hospital facilities, structure and staff, the first response system, and the patient information logging system.
5.	Access to and when appropriate copies of shift logs, organisational charts of the hospital, first responders, and units involved in the incidents described in the letter.	25/05/15	The FFM Advance Team was provided with a briefing on hospital organisation during the hospital visit. Copies of this briefing were not provided.
6.	Access to interview (and the opportunity to record interviews) any first responders, medical staff, explosive ordnance disposal personnel, witnesses or other persons involved in the incidents described in point 1 above as deemed appropriate by the FFM.	31/05/15	The authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic provided the FFM with a list of medical staff involved with the alleged incidents described in Note Verbale 150, and who would be available to be interviewed by the team. Explosive ordnance disposal personnel, other witnesses or persons involved were not identified by the Syrian Arab Republic.

No.	Description of Information / Service	Date provided	Comments
7.	Access to and copies of any photographic or video recordings related to the incidents described in the letter.	08/06/15	One CD with a video available on the Internet claimed to be related to the aftermath of the alleged incident in Jober on 29 August 2014.
8.	If safe to do so, access any locations where remnants of any ordnance or forensic evidence retrieved from the sites listed in the letter might be stored.	N/A	The authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic informed the FFM that no remnants of ordnance or other forensic evidence were retrieved from the sites listed in Note Verbale 150.
9.	Access to any other evidence, documentation, or persons connected to the incidents described in the letter.	Not provided	—
10.	Access to and copies of any additional relevant documents or other information to be reviewed during the FFM.	Not provided	—
11.	Any other matters that may become relevant during the FFM.	Various dates	See list of documents provided by Syrian Arab Republic NA in Annex 8. A number of these documents were already in the FFM's possession as they had appeared in Note Verbale 150. Other documents containing new information were reviewed, however no clear link could be established to any of the incidents investigated by the FFM in its mandate.

3.30 Next, based on its interviews with witnesses and casualties of the Jober alleged incident of 29 August 2014, the FFM submitted a request for additional information to the authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic. This request aimed to clarify the scenario as it had been described by the interviewees and allow for a more detailed understanding of the alleged incident. Table 4 lists the requests made by the FFM and the responses received from the authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic.

**TABLE 4: THE LIST OF REQUESTS MADE BY THE FACT-FINDING MISSION TO THE AUTHORITIES OF THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC, DATED 5 JUNE 2015**

No.	Description of Information / Service	Provided on	Comments
1.	The exact locations, including the co-ordinates and marked maps of the soap factory, the decontamination station and the Al-Abbassiyyin Polyclinic (مشفى العباسيين), all of which were mentioned in many of the interviews.	08/06/2015	Images from Google Earth detailing key locations related to the alleged incident in Jober on 29/08/2014
2.	Any written reports that may be available concerning the incident of 29 August 2014.	31/05/2015 and 08/06/2015	- A report containing a short summary of the alleged incident in Jober, not dated or signed. - An incident report by a Unit Commander dated 08/06/2015 related to the alleged incident in Jober on 29/08/2014
3.	A list of the first responders or ambulance personnel that transported casualties from the area of the soap factory to the Al-Abbassiyyin Polyclinic and the Martyr Youssef Al-Adhma Hospital (Hospital 601). It is requested that some of these personnel should be available for interview on Sunday 7 June 2015.	Not provided	—
4.	Reports on the disposal of the clothing that was removed from the casualties at the Dressing Station or the hospitals.	Not provided	—
5.	Access to review and copy the chest x-rays of a particular casualty listed and subsequently interviewed by the FFM (this individual's name was provided to the Syrian Arab Republic).	Not provided	—
6.	Access to review and copy medical laboratory analysis, blood test results and any related log books.	Not provided	—
7.	Photographs of the patient admission log at the mentioned hospitals.	Not provided	—

No.	Description of Information / Service	Provided on	Comments
8.	Video footage (or links) corresponding to the events described.	Not provided	No additional information was provided other than that listed on Table 3
9.	Clarification—in the form of a short written statement—of the reasons why the other casualties on the list for the alleged incident of 29 August 2014 could not be interviewed.	08/06/15	A list with names of soldiers who did not attend the interviews along with the reasons why

3.31 An analysis of the information gathered from the documents and services provided is can be found under the heading ‘Data Analysis Methodology Employed by the FFM’.

## SECOND DEPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES

3.32 As detailed in paragraph 3.13, the authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic informed the FFM Advance Team during its deployment in May 2015 that other, more recent incidents involving the alleged use of toxic chemicals had occurred in Syria. The Permanent Representation of the Syrian Arab Republic submitted to the OPCW Secretariat Note Verbale 41 (29 May 2015), Note Verbale 43 (3 June 2015), and Note Verbale 47 (15 June 2015) detailing these incidents.

3.33 The tables below summarise the information in Notes Verbales 41, 43, and 47.

**TABLE 5: SUMMARY OF ALLEGED INCIDENTS IN NOTE VERBALE 41**

No.	Date	Location	Number of Casualties
1.	19/03/2013	Khan Asal	144 (fatalities and injured)
2.	27/05/2013	Jober	11
3.	22/08/2013	Al-Bahriya	16
4.	24/08/2013	Jober	4
5.	August 2013	Muadamiyat al-Sham	No information provided
6.	24/04/2014	Dar'a - Nawa	70
7.	11/07/2014	Jober	6
8.	23/08/2014	Jober	11
9.	01/09/2014	Aleppo – Jam'iyyat al-Zahraa quarters	5 civilians injured
10.	08/01/2015	Nubel and al-Zahraa	17
11.	January 2015	Jober	21
12.	15/02/2015	Darayya	8
13.	06/04/2015	Jober	4
<b>Total</b>	<b>13 separate incidents</b>	<b>8 locations (areas around Damascus and Aleppo)</b>	<b>317 casualties</b>

**TABLE 6: SUMMARY OF ALLEGED INCIDENTS IN NOTE VERBALE 43**

No.	Date	Location	Number of Casualties
1.	29/05/2015	Harasta	7 fatalities and 10 injured personnel.
2.	29/05/2015	Al-Tadhamun	6 fatalities
3.	31/05/2015	Salqeen city	N/A – Report of possession of toxic chemicals
<b>Total</b>	<b>3 separate incidents</b>	<b>3 locations</b>	<b>23 casualties</b>

**TABLE 7: SUMMARY OF ALLEGED INCIDENTS IN NOTE VERBALE 47 AND ELABORATION OF 6 INCIDENTS REPORTED IN NOTE VERBALE 41**

No.	Date	Location	Number of Casualties	Comments
1.	15/02/2015	Darayya	8	A brief description of the alleged incident, signs and symptoms, a more precise location, the hospital where casualties received treatment, and the names of casualties (military personnel).
2.	08/01/2015	Nubel and al-Zahraa	Not mentioned	A brief description of the alleged incident, including signs and symptoms.
3.	06/04/2015	Jober	4	A brief description of the alleged incident, including signs and symptoms.
4.	January 2015	Jober	approx. 20	A brief description of the alleged incident, including signs and symptoms and mention of three fatalities.

No.	Date	Location	Number of Casualties	Comments
5.	01/09/2014	Aleppo – Jam’iyyat al-Zahraa quarters	5 civilians injured (including one fatality)	A brief description of the alleged incident, including signs and symptoms, and mention of one fatality.
6.	24/04/2014	Dar’a - Nawa	70 fatalities	A brief description of the alleged incident.
<b>Total</b>	<b>6 separate incidents</b>	<b>5 locations (areas around Damascus, Dar’a and Allepo)</b>	<b>approx. 107 casualties</b>	<b>N/A</b>

3.34 In light of the severity of the allegations made in Notes Verbales 41, 43, and 47, the Director-General dispatched the FFM to the Syrian Arab Republic for a second investigative deployment. For this deployment, the FFM’s mandate was to gather facts related to the alleged incidents described in Notes Verbales 41, 43 and 47, in addition to Note Verbale 150.

3.35 The Secretariat sent a note verbale to the authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic (NV/ODG/198787/15, dated 30 June 2015) proposing the scope of the investigation for the FFM’s second deployment. The FFM proposed to establish the facts on two additional alleged incidents that had reportedly taken place in 2014, and one in 2015, as indicated in Notes Verbales 150, 41, 43, and 47. As the availability of witnesses for interview was fluid in light of the security situation in the Syrian Arab Republic, the FFM sought confirmation from the authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic as to which witnesses would be available for interview prior to deployment. The FFM planned to use this information to select the incidents it would investigate once in country. Additionally, in order to ensure that the FFM team was able to perform its work efficiently within the 14-day time-frame agreed upon in the Terms of Reference, the FFM team suggested a maximum of 12 individuals to be interviewed per incident. These interviewees should, to the greatest extent possible, represent a cross-section of interviewee types, such as casualties, first responders, medical personnel, and eye witnesses.

3.36 In its second deployment to the Syrian Arab Republic, the FFM was composed of the mission team leader, seven team members, two medical doctors, and three interpreters. This deployment took place from 1 August 2015 to 16 August 2015. The FFM leadership provided a copy of its mandate (in English and Arabic) to the authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic at their first meeting on 3 August 2015.

#### **Investigative Activities**

3.37 As previously mentioned, the FFM proposed that the scope of its second deployment would include two alleged incidents reported to have taken place in 2014 and one in

2015, as indicated in Notes Verbales 150, 41, 43, and 47 (NV/ODG/198787/15, dated 30 June 2015). In order to prepare in an efficient and effective manner, the FFM requested that the authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic specify which alleged incidents could be investigated ahead of time. Information about the alleged incidents that could be investigated was provided to the FFM upon arrival in Damascus.

3.38 In this context, the following alleged incidents were investigated by the FFM during its second deployment:

- (a) An alleged incident in Al-Maliha on 16 April 2014
- (b) An alleged incident in Al-Maliha on 11 July 2014
- (c) An alleged incident in Al-Kabbas on 10 September 2014
- (d) An alleged incident in Nubel and al-Zahraa on 08 January 2015
- (e) An alleged incident in Darayya on 15 February 2015

3.39 In addition, the FFM asked to re-interview one casualty from the alleged incident of 29 August 2014 in Jober.

3.40 The Syrian Arab Republic also provided documents related to the following alleged incidents:

- (a) An alleged incident in Jober on 16 April 2014
- (b) An alleged incident in Al-Maliha on 2 July 2014
- (c) An alleged incident in Al-Maliha on 8 July 2014
- (d) An alleged incident in Darayya on 15 August 2014
- (e) An alleged incident in Jober on 4 September 2014
- (f) An alleged incident in Al-Kabbas on 18 September 2014

3.41 Furthermore, on 9 and 11 August 2015, the FFM requested another visit to Hospital 601. The aim of the visit was to obtain more information about patients who were admitted and related treatment protocols. This visit took place on 13 August 2015.

3.42 The FFM was also permitted to visit to the Centre for Studies and Scientific Research Institute in Barzi, Damascus, on 12 and 14 August 2015. The team received a site tour and had a discussion with the head of the research institute the storage and research methods for blood collected for AChE analysis. On 14 August 2015, the FFM sealed selected blood samples from the alleged incident in Darayya on 15 February 2015.


### **Interviews: Methodology and Activities**

- 3.43 The interview methodology was the same as in the first deployment and is described in this report under the heading ‘First Deployment Activities, The Main Body of the Fact-Finding Mission, Interviews: Methodology and Activities’.
- 3.44 In its letter detailing the proposed scope of the investigation for its second deployment, the FFM suggested that a maximum of 12 individuals be interviewed per alleged incident, and that two incidents reported to have taken place in 2014 and one in 2015 be investigated (NV/ODG/198787/15, dated 30 June 2015). Collecting the testimonies of a total of 36 interviewees meant ensuring that the FFM conducted its investigative activities in an efficient manner during the proposed time frame of the visit to the Syrian Arab Republic. In addition, the FFM requested that the interviewees for each incident represented a cross-section of casualties, first responders, medical personnel, and eye witnesses to the greatest extent possible.
- 3.45 The FFM’s letter also pointed out that the FFM leadership would like to discuss and confirm which witnesses would be available for interview prior to the team’s arrival in Damascus. This request envisaged allowing the team to prepare for the interviews ahead of time. Nonetheless, the FFM was aware of the possibility that the security situation in the Syrian Arab Republic might create restrictions on obtaining an advance list of interviewee names.
- 3.46 The FFM sent another note verbale requesting an opportunity to re-interview one casualty from the alleged incident in Jober on 29 August 2014 (NV/VER/CDB/199375/15, dated 30 July 2015). This request was made with a view to clarify points of the narrative of this particular incident, which had been the subject of investigation during the FFM’s first deployment (see ‘First Deployment Activities, The Main Body of the Fact-Finding Mission, Interviews: Methodology and Activities’ for more details).
- 3.47 Information about the availability of individuals to be interviewed and the alleged incidents to which they were connected was provided to the FFM during the initial meetings in Damascus. The Syrian Arab Republic proposed additional incidents and interviewees to the FFM. This proposal was agreed upon, on condition of the completion of all of the interviews within the time frame specified in the Terms of Reference.
- 3.48 The interviews commenced on 8 August 2015.
- 3.49 On 9 August 2015, after interviewing a number of casualties and medical staff, the FFM sent another request with a list of names of individuals to be interviewed. The requested individuals were medical staff relevant to the alleged incident in Darayya on 15 February 2015.
- 3.50 Tables 8 through 13 contain lists of interviews conducted for each alleged incident, as well as the reasons for selecting each individual for interview. In addition, Charts 3 through 9 detail the age and gender of each individual interviewed.

**TABLE 8: INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED IN RELATION TO THE ALLEGED INCIDENT IN AL-MALIHA ON 16 APRIL 2014**

S/N	Rank or Occupation of interviewed individual	Proximity to Incident in FFM Mandate	Date of interview
1.	Medic / Nurse	First aid point on ambulance	13/08/2015
2.	Captain	Casualty of the alleged incident	13/08/2015
3.	Lieutenant	Casualty of the alleged incident	13/08/2015

**CHART 3: AGE DISTRIBUTION AMONG THE INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED IN RELATION TO THE ALLEGED INCIDENT IN AL-MALIHA ON 16 APRIL 2014**




3.51 All of the witnesses interviewed in relation to the alleged incident in Al-Maliha on 16 April 2014 were male.

**TABLE 9: INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED IN RELATION TO THE ALLEGED INCIDENT IN AL-MALIHA ON 11 JULY 2014**

S/N	Rank or Occupation of interviewed individual	Proximity to Incident in FFM Mandate	Date of interview
1.	Military Personnel	Casualty of the alleged incident	13/08/2015
2.	Military Personnel	Casualty of the alleged incident	13/08/2015
3.	Military Personnel	Casualty of the alleged incident	13/08/2015
4.	Military Personnel	Casualty of the alleged incident	13/08/2015

**CHART 4: AGE DISTRIBUTION AMONG THE INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED IN RELATION TO THE ALLEGED INCIDENT IN AL-MALIHA ON 11 JULY 2014**




3.52 All of the witnesses interviewed in relation to the alleged incident in Al-Maliha on 11 July 2014 were male.

**TABLE 10: INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED IN RELATION TO THE ALLEGED INCIDENT IN AL-KABBAS ON 10 SEPTEMBER 2014**

S/N	Rank or Occupation of interviewed individual	Proximity to Incident in FFM Mandate	Date of interview
1.	Military Personnel	Casualty of the alleged incident	13/08/2015
2.	Medic / Nurse	First aid point on ambulance	13/08/2015
3.	Military Personnel	Casualty of the alleged incident	13/08/2015

**CHART 5: AGE DISTRIBUTION AMONG THE INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED IN RELATION TO THE ALLEGED INCIDENT IN AL-KABBAS ON 10 SEPTEMBER 2014**




3.53 All of the witnesses interviewed in relation to the alleged incident in Al-Kabbas on 10 September 2014 were male.

**TABLE 11: INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED IN RELATION TO THE ALLEGED INCIDENT IN NUBEL AND AL-ZAHRAA ON 8 JANUARY 2015**

S/N	Rank or Occupation of interviewed individual	Proximity to Incident in FFM Mandate	Date of interview
1.	Military medic	First Aid point - 150m	12/08/2015
2.	Civilian, local defence force	Casualty of the alleged incident	12/08/2015
3.	Civilian, local defence force	Casualty of the alleged incident	12/08/2015
4.	Civilian	Witness within visual range	12/08/2015

**CHART 6: AGE DISTRIBUTION AMONG THE INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED IN RELATION TO THE ALLEGED INCIDENT IN NUBEL AND AL-ZAHRAA ON 8 JANUARY 2015**




3.54 All of the witnesses interviewed in relation to the alleged incident in Nubel and al-Zahraa on 8 January 2015 were male.

**TABLE 12: INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED IN RELATION TO THE ALLEGED INCIDENT IN DARAYYA ON 15 FEBRUARY 2015**


S/N	Rank or Occupation of interviewed individual	Proximity to Incident in FFM Mandate	Date of interview
1.	Military Personnel	Casualty of the alleged incident	08/08/2015
2.	Military Personnel	Casualty of the alleged incident	09/08/2015
3.	Military Personnel	Casualty of the alleged incident	08/08/2015
4.	Military Personnel	Casualty of the alleged incident	08/08/2015
5.	Military Personnel	Casualty of the alleged incident	09/08/2015
6.	Military Personnel	Casualty of the alleged incident	09/08/2015
7.	Military Personnel	Casualty of the alleged incident	08/08/2015
8.	Military Personnel / Physician	Field physician at medical point	09/08/2015
9.	Senior consultant / Physician	Physician at Hospital 601	11/08/2015
10.	Cardiologist / Physician	Physician at Hospital 601	10/08/2015
11.	Resident Physician	Physician at Hospital 601	10/08/2015
12.	Physician	Supervisor / Physician at Hospital 601	11/08/2015
13.	Nurse	Nurse at Hospital 601	11/08/2015
14.	Physician, Internal and Endocrine	Physician at Hospital 601	10/08/2015
15.	Nurse	Nurse at Hospital 601	10/08/2015

3.55 The gender and age distribution of the casualties and medical staff interviewed by the FFM related to this alleged incident are depicted in Chart 7.

**CHART 7: AGE DISTRIBUTION AMONG THE INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED IN RELATION TO THE ALLEGED INCIDENT IN DARAYYA ON 15 FEBRUARY 2015**



**CHART 8: GENDER DISTRIBUTION AMONG THE INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED IN RELATION TO THE ALLEGED INCIDENT IN DARAYYA ON 15 FEBRUARY 2015**




3.56 In addition, testimonies from medical staff connected to more than one alleged incident were collected by the FFM. The information about these interviews is summarised in Table 13.

**TABLE 13: OTHER INTERVIEWEES**

S/N	Rank or Occupation of interviewed individual	Proximity to Incident in FFM Mandate	Date of interview	Comments
1.	Chief Surgeon	Head of Maliha Area Civilian Hospital	11/08/2015	Reviewed patient cases from four incidents
2.	General Surgeon	Al-Radhi Civilian Hospital	11/08/2015	Received patients from four incidents
3.	General Surgeon	Jarramana Civilian Hospital	11/08/2015	Received patients from four incidents
4.	Nurse	Hospital 601	11/08/2015	No casualty contact
5.	Chief Nurse	Hospital 601	11/08/2015	No casualty contact
6.	Military Personnel / Physician	Field physician at medical point	09/08/2015	Witnessed two incidents
7.	Medic / Nurse	First aid point on ambulance	13/08/2015	Witnessed two incidents

**CHART 9: AGE DISTRIBUTION AMONG OTHER WITNESSES**



3.57 All of the witnesses in Table 13 were male.

**Request for Information and Services: Methodology and Activities**

3.58 The FFM reviewed the information available in Notes Verbales 150, 41, 43, and 47 related to the incidents involving the alleged use of toxic chemicals and produced a

preliminary list of requests for information and services with a view to clarify and identify facts related to the alleged incidents.

- 3.59 This request for information and services to be provided to the FFM was submitted in a note verbale to the authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic (NV/ODG/198787/15, dated 30 June 2015). The correspondence specified that part of the information should be provided to the FFM prior to its deployment. Table 14 shows the list of requests made by the FFM, whether the request was to be provided prior to or during the FFM's deployment, the date when the request was met, and comments detailing what was provided. The contents of the documents provided by the Syrian Arab Republic were under review at the time at which this interim report was issued.

**TABLE 14: LIST OF REQUESTS MADE BY THE FACT-FINDING MISSION TO THE AUTHORITIES OF THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC, DATED 30 JUNE 2015**

No.	Description of Information / Service	Provided on	Comments
1.	Confirmed locations, including exact map coordinates, of all of the incidents reported in Notes Verbales 150, 41, 43, and 47. Requested to be provided to the FFM prior to its arrival in Damascus.	07/08/15	1xCD with images from Google Earth detailing key locations related to the alleged incident in Darayya (15/02/15).
		12/08/15	1xCD with images from Google Earth detailing key locations related to the alleged incident of Nubel and al-Zahraa (08/01/15).
		13/08/15	4xCDS with screenshots from Google Maps showing the locations of the following alleged incidents: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Al-Maliha (16/04/14)</li> <li>▪ Al-Maliha (08/07/14)</li> <li>▪ Al-Maliha (11/07/14)</li> <li>▪ Al-Kabbas (10/09/14)</li> </ul>
2.	Arrange for access to contemporaneous incident reports and copies thereof from all parties involved and regarding all of the incidents reported in Notes Verbales 150, 41, 43, and 47.	07/08/15	A report from the commander of the unit deployed in Darayya on the date of the alleged incident on 15/02/15. Report not dated.
		12/08/15	A complaint about the incident registered with the Nubel police station and related to the alleged incident of Nubel and al-Zahraa on 08/01/15.
		13/08/15	A report of the Colonel in command of Administrative Unit 270, relating to the alleged incident in Mliha (16/04/14). Report not dated. A report from the Commander of Battalion 177, Mechanised Infantry, relating to the alleged

No.	Description of Information / Service	Provided on	Comments
			<p>incident in Al-Maliha (08/07/14). Report dated 11/08/2014.</p> <p>A report from the Colonel Commander of Battalion 177, Mechanised Infantry, relating to the alleged incident in Al-Maliha (11/07/14). Report dated 11/08/2014.</p> <p>A report from the Colonel in command of Battalion 408, Artillery, relating to the alleged incident of Al-Kabbas (10/09/14). Report dated 13/10/2014</p>
3.	<p>Arrange for access to and copies of any medical records, including patient history forms, treatment plans, x-ray images, prescription forms, discharge forms, or any other relevant information deemed necessary by the FFM, for all of the casualties named in Notes Verbales 150, 41, 43, and 47.</p>	<p>07/08/15</p> <p>07/08/15</p> <p>10/08/15</p> <p>12/08/15</p> <p>13/08/15</p>	<p>Medical records of 8 casualties listed in Note Verbale 47, relating to the alleged incident in Darayya (15/02/15)</p> <p>AchE results for 6 casualties listed in Note Verbale 47, relating to the alleged incident in Darayya (15/02/15)</p> <p>Medical records of 7 casualties listed in Note Verbale 150.</p> <p>A report from the al-Zahraa hospital referring to the alleged incident in Nubel and al-Zahraa (08/01/15) (Notes Verbales 41 and 47).</p> <p>Medical records of 35 casualties listed in Note Verbale 150</p> <p>AchE results (dated 21-23/04/14) for 14 casualties listed in Note Verbale 150</p>
4.	<p>If safe to do so, arrange for visits to the hospitals or clinics in Damascus or any other locations where the casualties named in Notes Verbales 150, 41, 43, and 47 were treated.</p>	13/08/15	<p>Another visit to the hospital was arranged for the FFM.</p>
5.	<p>Arrange for access to and copies of shift logs and organisational charts of the hospitals, clinics, or other locations where casualties of the incidents reported in Notes Verbales 150, 41, 43, and 47 were treated.</p>	N/A	—

No.	Description of Information / Service	Provided on	Comments
6.	Identify and arrange for access to interview any persons involved in the incidents reported in Notes Verbales 150, 41, 43 and 47, as deemed appropriate by the FFM in accordance with previously agreed practice and protocol.	Various dates	Interviews were conducted as described in this report under the heading 'Deployment Activities, Investigation Activities, Interviews: Methodology and Activities'.
7.	Arrange access to any photographic materials or video recordings and copies thereof relating to the incidents reported in Notes Verbales 150, 41, 43, and 47. Requested to be provided to the FFM prior to its arrival in Damascus.	N/A	Not provided due to unavailability of the requested material.
8.	If safe to do so, arrange access to any locations where remnants of any ordnance or forensic evidence retrieved from the sites related to incidents reported in Notes Verbales 150, 41, 43, and 47 may be located or stored.	N/A	Not provided due to the security situation.
9.	Arrange access to any other information or documentation relevant to the incidents reported in Notes Verbales 150, 41, 43, and 47. Requested to be provided to the FFM prior to its arrival in Damascus.	07/08/15	List of patients admitted to Hospital 601, relating to the alleged incident in Darayya (15/02/15)
		10/08/15	List of patients admitted to Hospital 601 relating to the alleged incident in Al-Kabbas (18/09/14)
		12/08/15	List of patients admitted to Hospital 601 for the following alleged incidents reported in Note Verbale 150: Jober (16/04/14), Al-Maliha (16/04/15), Al-Maliha (11/07/14), Darayya (15/08/14), Jober (04/09/14), Al-Kabbas (10/09/14), and Al-Kabbas (18/09/14).
		13/08/15	List of patients admitted to Al-Radhi hospital on the following dates: 16/04/14, the night between 16/04/14 and 17/04/14, 08/07/14,

No.	Description of Information / Service	Provided on	Comments
			and 12/07/14
10.	Arrange access to and copies of any additional relevant documents or other information to be reviewed during the FFM. Requested to be provided to the FFM prior to its arrival in Damascus.	13/08/15	8xDVDs with video footage
		14/08/15	Pack of colour images of weapons
11.	Assist with any other matter that the FFM team deems relevant to its work during the course of the visit.	N/A	—

3.60 Next, based on the interviews with the witnesses and casualties of the various alleged incidents, the FFM submitted requests for additional information to the authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic. The requests aimed to clarify the various issues that were identified during the interviews and subsequent review of documents. A comprehensive list of requests made by the FFM during its deployment and the responses received from the authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic will be provided in a subsequent report.

## DATA ANALYSIS

### Data Analysis Methodology Employed by the Fact-Finding Mission

- 3.61 The FFM inspectors conducted an analysis of the alleged incidents, with a focus on identifying aspects related to the use of chemicals as a weapon. The analysis methodology used by the team to evaluate interviews and documents provided by the authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic is described in this report under the following headings: ‘Interview Analysis Methodology’ (paragraphs 3.64 – 3.67) and ‘Analysis of Information Provided to the Fact-Finding Mission in the Form of Documents and Services’.
- 3.62 The analysis of the medical information provided to the FFM in the form of records, services, or testimonies collected by the team was carried out by the medical doctors attached to the FFM and is described in Annex 1 to this report.
- 3.63 Both of the analyses specified in paragraphs 3.61 and 3.62 were taken into account to fulfil the FFM’s mandate.

#### Interview Analysis Methodology

3.64 The interview analysis methodology employed by the FFM allowed individual accounts to be collated into a prevailing narrative where factual content could be extracted and reported according to the mandate. The various steps of this methodology are described in the next paragraphs.

- 3.65 First, the audio and video records of each interview conducted by the team were translated and transcribed into English by qualified interpreters in order to facilitate their thorough analysis.
- 3.66 Then, the verbal content of each interview (video, audio, and transcripts thereof) was carefully reviewed by at least two FFM inspectors. In order to organise the individual responses, a timeline-based analysis table was produced. This allowed each respondent's description of locations, sights, sounds, smells, and actions to be categorised according to relevant variables. During the interview review process, the FFM inspectors matched the interviewees' responses to their respective variables in the analysis table. The result for each interview was a unique description of the evolving, sequential event, from the perspective of that individual interviewee. Once all relevant narratives had been assembled individually, they were compared against one another to identify commonalities and discrepancies.
- 3.67 Commonalities formed the basis of the prevailing narrative and discrepancies were analysed to determine their significance. Given that some of the alleged incidents subject to investigation had occurred more than a year prior to the interviews, the FFM anticipated reasonable discrepancies in the recalled events from one respondent to the next. In cases where discrepancies were minor or of little consequence to establishing a prevailing narrative (i.e., the recollection of general timings and distances), they were disregarded. In cases where discrepancies were more significant, or where they starkly deviated from the prevailing narrative, they were noted and assessed further in the context of other evidence to see if they could be reconciled. If reconciliation with the prevailing narrative was not possible, the discrepant narrative could be considered limited in value and therefore difficult to objectively address the FFM's mandate aims. However, cases where discrepant narratives detailed other severe allegations in relation to the use of toxic chemicals as a weapon have also been noted by the FFM.
- 3.68 The following sections provide the analysis of the testimonies collected by the FFM and categorised by each alleged incident.

Analysis of Information Provided to the Fact-Finding Mission in the Form of Documents and Services

- 3.69 The information and services provided to the FFM by the authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic is listed in this report under the headings 'First Deployment Activities, the Main Body of the Fact-Finding Mission, Interviews: Methodology and Activities', and 'Second Deployment Activities, Request for Information and Services: Methodology and Activities'. The FFM reviewed the information provided in order to gather facts regarding the incidents involving the alleged use of toxic chemicals. The analysis of the documents pertaining to each incident that was investigated is described in the sections below.

**Analysis of the Alleged Incident in Jober on 29 August 2014**

Interview Analysis

- 3.70 The prevailing narrative established by a review of all of the interviews relating to this alleged incident is as follows:

- (a) It is apparent that some form of military engagement occurred on 29 August 2014 in the described area of Jober, Damascus. In this military engagement, a group of about 35 soldiers from the Syrian Arab Army were preparing to advance towards an area held by an opposition group.
- (b) An alleged chemical incident occurred around 18:00. In this incident, a number of soldiers were proximate to two launched objects of an unknown type which landed in the street. Some of the soldiers were indoors, while others were outdoors.
- (c) Upon the objects' impact, the soldiers noted some combination of dust, smoke, or mist, which produced a distinct odour described by most as being similar to rotting flesh.
- (d) This unidentifiable malodorous substance triggered a host of varying symptoms, the overall presentation of which was consistent with acute, non-specific irritation of the mucosa and respiratory tract.
- (e) The affected soldiers assisted one another in retreating from the impact area and received general supportive care at a forward medical point (Al-Abbassayyin) before being evacuated by ambulance to a military hospital some distance away (Hospital 601).
- (f) In hospital, non-specific supportive care continued for the affected soldiers until discharge, which in most cases was within 24 hours of arrival. The general condition upon discharge varied considerably amongst the affected soldiers, although all reported improvement.

3.71 The FFM identified a notable discrepancy in the prevailing narrative referring to an additional alleged chemical incident. The main points of this discrepant narrative are approximately as follows:

- (a) Two of the casualties interviewed by the FFM alleged that an incident involving a toxic chemical occurred around 16:00 on the same day.
- (b) According to the testimonies of these two casualties, a group of around 15 soldiers of the Syrian Arab Army were confronting enemies in Jober when a device allegedly filled with what was described by these two soldiers as a chlorine-like gas was thrown at the group.
- (c) The alleged chemical incident incapacitated some of the group, apparently preventing them from escaping the scene and ultimately leading to their capture and execution.
- (d) The two soldiers who were interviewed described symptoms upon contact with the alleged chemical that are consistent with acute, non-specific irritation of the mucosa and respiratory tract.
- (e) There then followed a combat/fire fight with opposition groups that led to other fatalities and the capture of other members of the group.

- (f) The two soldiers interviewed by the FFM were the only ones who managed to flee the scene.
- 3.72 The FFM was not able to identify a cohesive narrative based on the testimonies of these particular casualties. Additionally, the FFM could not corroborate this narrative with the prevailing narrative established by the analysis of the testimonies from the bulk of interviewees. The authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic did provide footage from an open source which purported to describe the aftermath of this incident (see Table 3, Number 7.). However, the FFM could not establish a firm link between this footage and the alleged incident.
- 3.73 The FFM sought further clarification regarding this alleged incident by requesting to re-interview a relevant witness during its second deployment. The FFM was not able to establish further facts regarding this alleged incident upon reviewing the testimony of the witness.

Analysis of Information Provided to the Fact-Finding Mission in the Form of Documents and Services

- 3.74 The information and services provided by the authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic assisted the FFM in clarifying the following:
- (a) The document entitled “Report of Colonel Commander of Brigade 358 for Special Missions on the Exposure of a Group of Soldiers from the Brigade to the Inhalation of Toxic Gases” offered a brief description of the alleged incident that took place on 29 August 2014 in Jobar (referred to in Note Verbale 150). This document provided an overview of the incident. The information in the report included the mission assigned to the Brigade involved, the starting point, the location and number of explosions that occurred on this date, a description of the smell of the explosion (reported as chlorine-like, according to witnesses), a brief description of the device (a locally made device), the firing point of devices (according to the firing sound), the number of soldiers affected by two devices that exploded later on, the evacuation route taken by the soldiers, and brief mention of treatment, rest, and recuperation.
- (b) The images from Google Earth® provided by the authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic detailing key locations related to the alleged incident in Jobar on 29 August 2014 assisted the FFM in identifying the position of the casualties involved on the day of the event. The images point out locations where the soldiers were before, during and after the incident (see Annex 4).
- (c) Medical records which are described in the Medical Report attached to this document.
- 3.75 The FFM is confident that it would have been able to establish facts related to this alleged incident in an independent and unambiguous manner if more information had been made available to the team complementing what was provided by the authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic. This information would also have been useful to corroborate the testimonies of the casualties and witnesses interviewed by the FFM. The FFM believes that a combination of the following items or information, which

were not available for assessment by the FFM, would be crucial in establishing facts with a higher degree of confidence:

- (a) Photographic or video recordings of the alleged incident;
- (b) A visit to the site where the alleged incident took place;
- (c) Detailed medical records including, inter alia, x-rays, pulmonary function tests, and timely blood laboratory values. Further details are described in the Medical Report annexed to this report;
- (d) Timely biomedical samples from the patients;
- (e) Remnants of any ordnance, launching system, or other forensic evidence retrieved from the location of the alleged incident;
- (f) Unfired ordnance similar to what was used in the alleged incident;
- (g) Environmental samples from the surroundings of the location of the alleged incident, including background samples;
- (h) Comprehensive contemporaneous incident reports generated by the chain of military command and the medical system;
- (i) Comprehensive witness testimonies generated at the time of the incident; and
- (j) A greater sample of witness testimonies.

3.76 The authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic explained that these records or items were not available, either because they had never been generated, due to the long period of time that had passed since the alleged incident, or due to difficulties caused by the current security situation in the country.

3.77 Thus, it was not possible for the FFM to ascertain factual findings through the documentation and services provided prior to the interview process such as:

- (a) The nature of the alleged incident;
- (b) Whether any toxic chemical was used as a weapon in the incident;
- (c) The identification of a potential chemical, if any;
- (d) Actual timing of incidents;
- (e) A detailed visual and audible description of the explosions;
- (f) A detailed visual or olfactory description of any chemical clouds released by the explosions;
- (g) The type, format, or other technical details about the explosive devices;

- (h) Comprehensive descriptions of the signs and symptoms associated with potential exposure and the appropriate treatment;
- (i) A confirmed number of fatalities and associated autopsy reports; and
- (j) The fate of the explosive devices and any Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) analysis.

#### **Analysis of the Alleged Incident in Al-Maliha on 16 April 2014**

- 3.78 The FFM was in the process of carrying out the analysis of this alleged incident at the time at which this interim report was issued.

#### **Analysis of the Alleged Incident in Al-Maliha on 11 July 2014**

- 3.79 The FFM was in the process of carrying out the analysis of this alleged incident at the time at which this interim report was issued.

#### **Analysis of the Alleged Incident in Al-Kabbas on 10 September 2014**

- 3.80 The FFM was in the process of carrying out the analysis of this alleged incident at the time at which this interim report was issued.

#### **Analysis of the Alleged Incident in Nubel and al-Zahraa on 8 January 2015**

- 3.81 The FFM was in the process of carrying out the analysis of this alleged incident at the time at which this interim report was issued.

#### **Analysis of the Alleged Incident in Darayya on 15 February 2015**

- 3.82 The FFM was in the process of carrying out the analysis of this alleged incident at the time at which this interim report was issued.

## **4. CONCLUSIONS**

### **FACT-FINDING MISSION: MANDATED AIMS**

*Gather facts regarding the incidents of alleged use of toxic chemicals, particularly chlorine, as a weapon, as detailed in the correspondence No. 150, dated 15 December 2014, No. 41, dated 29 May 2015, No. 43, dated 3 June 2015, No. 47, dated 15 June 2015, received from the Syrian Arab Republic, mindful that the task of the FFM does not include the question of attributing responsibility for the alleged use.*

#### **Alleged incident in Jobar, Damascus, on 29 August 2014**

- 4.1 The FFM is of the opinion that it would have been able to be more precise in its findings if further objective evidence, complementing what was provided by the authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic, had been made available to the team. The FFM was not able to obtain hard evidence related to this incident, either because it was unavailable or because it was not generated in the first place. The lack of hard evidence precluded the FFM from gathering further facts in a definitive way.

Evidence such as those listed below would have been crucial for the FFM in establishing facts with a higher degree of confidence:

- (a) Photographic or video recordings of the alleged incident;
- (b) A visit to the site where the alleged incident took place;
- (c) Detailed medical records including, inter alia, x-rays, pulmonary function tests, and timely blood laboratory values. Further details are described in the Medical Report annexed to this report;
- (d) Timely biomedical samples from the patients;
- (e) Remnants of any ordnance, launching system, or other forensic evidence retrieved from the location of the alleged incident;
- (f) Unfired ordnance similar to those used in the alleged incident;
- (g) Environmental samples from the surroundings of the location of the alleged incident, including background samples;
- (h) Comprehensive contemporaneous incident reports generated by the chain of military command and the medical system; and
- (i) Comprehensive witness testimonies generated at the time of the incident.

4.2 Such evidence would have also been valuable in corroborating the testimonies of the casualties and witnesses interviewed by the FFM.

4.3 Therefore, based only on the interviews that were carried out and the documents that were reviewed, the FFM is of the view that the soldiers who were interviewed may have been exposed to some type of non-persistent, airborne irritant secondary to the surface impact of two launched objects. However, based on the evidence presented by the Syrian Arab Republic, the medical records that have been reviewed and the prevailing narrative of all of the interviews, the FFM cannot confidently determine whether or not this potential irritant was produced by factors, including but not limited to:

- (a) A chemical payload contained in the launched objects;
- (b) A combustion product of a propellant;
- (c) The detonation of a conventional or improvised explosive device on a stored chemical already in-situ;
- (d) A mixture of detonation products with surface soil and dust; or
- (e) Some combination of all of the factors mentioned above.

4.4 Furthermore, the FFM is of the view that while the general clinical presentation of those affected in the incident is consistent with brief exposure to any number of

chemicals or environmental insults, the visual and olfactory description of the potential irritant does not clearly implicate any specific chemical.

*Report to the Director-General upon conclusion of FFM Activities*

- 4.5 The FFM has concluded its activities as mandated by the Director-General for its first deployment and hereby submits this interim report for consideration.

**Fact-Finding Mission: Operational Instructions**

*The inspection team shall establish the facts pertaining to two incidents in 2014 and one incident in 2015, as detailed and reported in the correspondence No. 150, dated 15 December 2014, No. 41, dated 29 May 2015, No. 43, dated 3 June 2015 and No. 47, dated 15 June 2015, taking into consideration the availability of suitable interviewees, representing, to the fullest extent possible, a cross-section of casualties, which may include first responders, medical personnel, and eye witnesses.<sup>1</sup>*

*The inspection team is instructed to:*

*Review and analyse all available information pertaining to reported incidents of alleged use of toxic chemicals, particularly chlorine, as a weapon;*

- 4.6 Information that was made available by the Syrian Arab Republic pertaining to the reported incidents involving the alleged use of toxic chemicals and that was reviewed and analysed by the FFM can be found in the following sections of this report:
- (a) First Deployment Activities, the Main Body of the Fact-Finding Mission, Requests for Information and Services: Methodology and Activities; and
  - (b) Second Deployment Activities, Interviews: Methodology and Activities

*Collect testimonies from persons alleged to have been affected by the use of toxic chemicals, particularly chlorine, as a weapon, including those who underwent treatment, eye witnesses of the alleged use of toxic chemicals, particularly chlorine, medical personnel and other persons who have been treated or come into contact with persons who may have been affected by the alleged use of toxic chemicals, particularly chlorine;*

- 4.7 The methodology that the FFM employed and the activities it undertook in collecting testimonies from persons deemed relevant to the investigation into the alleged use of toxic chemicals, particularly chlorine, as a weapon, are found in the following sections of this report:
- (a) First Deployment Activities, the Main Body of the Fact-Finding Mission, Requests for Information and Services: Methodology and Activities; and
  - (b) Deployment Activities, Investigation Activities, Interviews: Methodology and Activities.

- 4.8 In addition, details of the interview analysis methodology and the prevailing narrative of the testimonies obtained by the FFM are described in this report under the heading 'Data Analysis Methodology Employed by the Fact-Finding Mission'.

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<sup>1</sup> The opening paragraph of the FFM's Operational Instructions is applicable to the team's second deployment

*Where possible, and deemed necessary, carry out medical examinations, including autopsies, and collect biomedical samples of those alleged to have been affected;*

- 4.9 The FFM did not carry out medical examinations, including autopsies, due to the passage of time since the alleged incidents.
- 4.10 Biomedical samples collected by the Syrian Arab Republic in relation to the alleged incident of 15 February 2015 in Darayya were retrieved by the FFM and sent for analysis at designated OPCW laboratories or certified laboratories. The analysis results were not available at the time at which this report was issued.
- 4.11 Biomedical samples for other incidents listed in the applicable notes verbales were not available to the FFM.

*If possible, visit the hospitals and other locations as deemed relevant to the conduct its investigations;*

- 4.12 The FFM visited the military hospital Martyr Youssef Al-Adhma on 27 May 2015 (see the section of this report under the heading 'First Deployment Activities, Advance Team Activities') and on 13 August 2015 (see the section of this report under the heading 'Second Deployment Activities, Investigation Activities'). In addition, the FFM visited the Centre for Studies and Scientific Research Institute in Barzi, Damascus, on 12 and 14 August 2015 (see the section of this report under the heading 'Second Deployment Activities, Investigation Activities').

*Examine and, if possible, collect copies of, the hospital records including patient registers, treatment records, and any other relevant records, as deemed necessary;*

- 4.13 During its first deployment, the FFM received copies of medical record for victims. They were reviewed, photographed, photocopied, documented as evidence, and analysed.
- 4.14 The FFM received various medical records and reports from Hospital 601 regarding the alleged incidents. Details about these records are provided in the Medical Report attached to this interim report.

*Examine and, if possible, collect copies of any other documentation and records deemed necessary;*

- 4.15 Documentation and records that the FFM deemed necessary for the investigation, the dates when said documentation was provided, and a brief description of contents can be found in the following sections of this report:
- (a) First Deployment Activities, the Main Body of the Fact-Finding Mission, Requests for Information and Services: Methodology and Activities; and
  - (b) Second Deployment Activities, Interviews: Methodology and Activities.

- 4.16 In addition, the analysis of information relevant to each alleged incident investigated by the FFM is described in this report under the heading 'Data Analysis'.

*Take photographs and examine, and if possible collect copies of video and telephone records*

- 4.17 The authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic provided copies of video and telephone records as described in the following sections of this report:
- (a) First Deployment Activities, the Main Body of the Fact-Finding Mission, Requests for Information and Services: Methodology and Activities;
  - (b) Second Deployment Activities, Interviews: Methodology and Activities; and
  - (c) Annex 7.

*If possible, and deemed necessary, physically examine and take samples from remnants of cylinders, containers, etc., alleged to have been used during the incidents under investigation*

- 4.18 As described in the sections of this report under the headings ‘First Deployment Activities, the Main Body of the Fact-Finding Mission’, ‘Requests for Information and Services: Methodology and Activities’, and ‘Second Deployment Activities, Interviews: Methodology and Activities’, cylinders, containers, etc., alleged to have been used during the incidents under investigation were not available during the mission. Therefore, the FFM did not examine or take samples from these items.

*If possible, and deemed necessary, collect environmental samples at the alleged points of incidents and surrounding areas*

- 4.19 Due to the prevailing security situation, the FFM did not make any visits to the sites of alleged incidents and therefore could not recover any environmental samples.

*Provide the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic with a duplicate or a portion of each environmental sample, if any, and, to the extent possible, a duplicate or portion of each of the bio-medical samples collected in the course of the Mission*

- 4.20 This item has yet to be determined and will be addressed in the next report.

*Cooperate fully with the relevant authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic with regard to all of the aspects of the Mission*

- 4.21 The FFM maintained constant communication with the relevant authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic throughout its mission and cooperated with them on all aspects.

*All activities of the FFM will be undertaken in accordance with the relevant Technical Secretariat procedures relating to the conduct of inspections during contingency operations, as applicable.*

- 4.22 The FFM performed its activities in observance of all applicable procedures related to contingency operations. A list of standard operating procedures and working instructions referred to by the FFM during its mission is referenced in Annex 8 of this report. In addition, the FFM maintained a list of deviations from standard procedures if certain procedures needed to be tailored to the FFM’s activities, and included the reasons for any modifications.

**5. SIGNATURE**

5.1 This Fact-Finding Mission report was submitted on 27 October 2015 in English.

[Signed]  
Steven Wallis  
Mission Leader

## **Annex 1**

### **MEDICAL REPORT ON THE ALLEGED USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN THE JOBER AREA OF DAMASCUS, SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC, ON THE 29TH OF AUGUST 2014**

#### **METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS**

1. In its investigation of incidents of alleged use of chemical weapons against the Syrian Arab Republic military, the mission focused on a reported incident in the Jober Area of Damascus on the 29<sup>th</sup> of August 2014. According to NV 150, this incident resulted in the treatment of 33 soldiers who collectively exhibited symptoms consistent with toxic or irritant inhalation. Interviews were conducted with 22 victims and 16 medical staff to elucidate further details and establish a clear narrative.
2. All information received, be it through witness statements, pictures, video, audio, patient records or other documentation, is recorded and registered for filing and archiving.
3. methodology for interviews and documentation were consistent with well-established standard operating procedures (SOP's), developed and enforced by the OPCW and the WHO.

#### **ETHICAL ISSUES AND CONSIDERATIONS**

4. In conducting the interviews, full consideration was given to the privacy and protection of participants. All information gathered from interviews was kept confidential with the identity of each interviewee protected at all times. An identity number was assigned to each participant and this number was used for processing of data. The mission made all efforts to respect religious values and norms, national customs and the personal pressures and traumas associated with exposure to conflict.

#### **COMPOSITION OF INTERVIEWEES**

5. The 22 alleged victims presented by the Syrian National Authority to participate in the interviews had all been among the group of soldiers involved in an attack in the Jober Area of Damascus at around 6 pm on the 29<sup>th</sup> of August 2014. The average age was 25, with a range of 19 to 33. All were male and all were Syrian nationals of Arabic descent.
6. 8 treating physicians, 6 nurses, 1 medical assistant and 1 first responder were also interviewed; the majority of whom had participated in the care of the soldiers at the Martyr Yusuf Al Azama Hospital, also referred to as Hospital 601. Some medical interviewees had been stationed at al Abbassiyin Hospital, a minimally equipped facility located in Jober where a number of soldiers received first aid and basic decontamination before being transported to the Hospital 601.

## **DETAILED INTERVIEWS WITH SOLDIERS**

7. Interviews were conducted in two private rooms at the Sheraton Hotel in Damascus and were, in most cases, video and audio recorded. One interviewee did not accept video recording but accepted audio recording, one interviewee did not accept video or audio recording, but agreed to a written transcription facilitated by an interpreter.
8. The interviews followed a semi-structured format and aimed to extract a 'free recall' narrative of the events and their timeline, as well as details of actions taken by the individuals following impact, symptoms following exposure and the resulting actions and treatments performed by others. Recovery and possible long term effects were also discussed. Since some victims reported having fallen unconscious directly after the impact, the interview process was adapted to fit each perspective and extract the most pertinent information from each interviewee.
9. All soldiers reported a situation wherein they were attacked by two launched explosive devices whose impact produced a very bad smell. All 22 soldiers developed symptoms (see the chart below) with very short onset and varying degrees of severity. The victims who were exposed all recall that the gas had a particular odour which some compared to the smell of dead animals or corpses and others reported as similar to rotten eggs. Still others reported that they had never experienced anything similar before and couldn't compare the smell to anything.
10. About 1/3 of the victims lost consciousness on the site and can't recall how they were taken to the first-aid medical point or hospital. Others report that they were taken by military vehicles to al Abbasiyin Hospital where some received a quick decontamination with water before being transported to Hospital 601 in an ambulance.
11. In Hospital 601 most reported being more thoroughly decontaminated with water and being given new clothes before receiving symptomatic treatment with oxygen, intravenous fluids and in some cases inhalation of  $\beta_2$  agonists such as salbutamol.
12. All admitted soldiers stayed at least one night in hospital, with 50 % reporting that they stayed more than one night before being discharged to their unit with orders to rest for a number of days. None reported any significant symptoms from the incident to the present day.

## **INTERVIEWS WITH MEDICAL STAFF**

13. The interviews with treating physicians, nurses and first responders also followed a semi-structured format that built upon a 'free recall' wherein each interviewee relayed their specific memory of the event. Points for clarification followed the free recall and were aimed primarily at collecting information on observed symptoms, treatment provided and subsequent clinical progress. Particular focus was also on the presence or absence of secondary contamination from soldier to caregiver at any point during the rendering of first-aid, transport or definitive treatment in hospital.
14. Each were asked to describe the symptoms exhibited by the patients, either in transit (in cases of transporting medical staff) or on arrival to the Hospital 601 ED (see the

chart below) as well as the development of these symptoms and the actions taken during evacuation and at the hospital. None of the medical staff interviewed reported noticing any particular smell from the victims and none reported any symptoms of secondary contamination.

15. Interviews with medical staff at the Hospital 601 revealed that the decontamination via removal of clothing and showering commenced before anyone was brought into the emergency department (ED). In the ED the patients received symptomatic treatment and then they were taken to different wards in the hospital where they all recovered quickly and were discharged on the following day or in some cases two days later.

#### **REVIEW OF MEDICAL RECORDS**

16. Medical records were presented to the FFM for a majority of the patients who came to be interviewed (19 out of 22). In most cases, records were received some days in advance which allowed for translation, copying for review and documentation.
17. These records were reviewed for demographics, clinical presentation, treatment, and admission duration and discharge status. The medical records were all very short, consisting of a bi-folded sheet of cardstock with a stapled addendum.
18. The submitted records were also reviewed during interviews with specific medical personnel when clarification was needed. A log book from the emergency department at Hospital 601 covering the patients treated on the 29<sup>th</sup> of August 2014 was also presented and documented by the FFM team.
19. In support of the presented symptoms during interviews a particular interest to the mission doctors were objective diagnostic information such as:
  - (a) Radiological reports (CT, MRI and X-ray)
  - (b) Pulmonary function test (PFT) results
  - (c) Laboratory analysis of blood, skin, sputum, urine, etc.
20. The records indicate that patients received symptomatic treatments such as:
  - (a) Oxygen,
  - (b) Nebulized salbutamol,
  - (c) Intravenous fluids (NaCl 0,9 %),
  - (d) Intravenous hydrocortisone (corticosteroid),
  - (e) Intravenous metoclopramide (antiemetic)
  - (f) An unidentified antihistamine which was referred to in the record, but whose specific name could not be translated.

21. in the medical records no information was found about laboratory tests, pulmonary function tests or x-ray results.

### **SYMPTOMS**

22. In general, the symptoms described by the soldiers and those observed by the medical personnel are largely consistent and can be described as the following:

- (a) Breathing difficulties 91 %
- (b) Burning sensation in the eyes, blurred vision and lacrimation 77 %
- (c) Nausea and vomiting 64 %
- (d) Reduced consciousness 50 %
- (e) Fatigue 35 %
- (f) Excessive salivation / drooling 25 %
- (g) Dry mouth 18 %

23. For a full report on symptoms described by victims, medical personnel, first responders and medical records see table below.

24. According to the bulk of interviewee recollections, the described symptoms occurred within a minute of exposure to an unknown gas having what was widely described as a 'very unpleasant' smell. Severity of reported symptoms appeared to be higher among those closest to the point where the reported munitions impacted the ground and the observed odour was produced.

25. For all soldiers taken to the hospital the Recovery was very fast, most spending only one night in hospital for observation and supportive care. Some were granted several days leave upon discharge and all returned back to their units. None of the soldiers reported having been informed of a specific diagnosis upon discharge, none were prescribed any course of medication and none received any specific, post-exposure follow up instructions or tests.

26. Neither in interviews nor in medical records were any reports of foul smells emanating from the exposed, nor were there any reports of signs of secondary contamination among those who assisted or transported the victims.

### **COMPARISON OF RECORDS AND INTERVIEWS**

27. Medical records were all quite repetitious in their description of symptoms and treatment. There is a significant discrepancy between the signs documented in the medical records, the signs recalled by medical staff and the symptoms recalled by the victims. The table below highlights the differences between these sources.

**Symptoms as documented and described during the interview process by percent:**

<b>Symptoms</b>	<b>Symptoms Documented in Medical records</b>	<b>Symptoms Described by Victims During Interview</b>	<b>Symptoms Described by Medical staff During Interview</b>
<b>Tightness in chest</b>	53	50	19
<b>Dyspnoea, shortness of breath</b>	32	41	58
<b>Coughing</b>	5	14	6
<b>Excessive salivation</b>	32	23	56
<b>Running nose</b>	21	36	12
<b>Burning sensation in the eyes</b>	89	64	62
<b>Blurred vision</b>	58	45	25
<b>Lacrimation</b>	42	54	38
<b>Nausea</b>	63	41	12
<b>Vomiting</b>	10	27	12
<b>Fatigue</b>	42	23	25
<b>Headache</b>	10	0	0
<b>Dizziness</b>	5	9	0
<b>Disorientation</b>	0	9	56
<b>Loss of consciousness</b>	0	36	12
<b>Dry mouth</b>	0	18	0

Airway symptoms

28. Interviewees reported different severities of breathing problems. Despite this no patient was in need of intubation or any other advance airway support. No patient was taken to the intensive care unit. As for the very specific symptom “Excessive salivation” only 25% of the victims recall that they suffered from salivation and 18 % claim that they were suffering from dry mouth, at the same time more than 50 % of the medical staff recalls that the patients salivated excessively. This discrepancy is hard to explain.

Consciousness

29. While a considerable number of victims and medical personnel described symptoms like disorientation and loss of consciousness, these symptoms are not documented in the medical records. The medical personnel interviewed described many of the patients as disoriented and aggressive, while the medical records state that they were

awake and responsive. The discrepancy between the victim's description of their status, the medical personnel's description of the patients' status and the medical records may indicate that there is a significant degree of amnesia among the alleged victims, or may challenge the reliability of the records themselves.

#### Recovery

30. for all alleged victims taken to the hospital the recovery was very fast. According to the written medical records, all patients were discharged back to their units after a 24 hour admission. This introduces a discrepancy between the story provided by the soldiers wherein 50 % of them report a hospitalization of two nights or more. It is unclear why the two sources of information do not agree.

#### Tests

31. Many of the interviewed soldiers and medical personnel recalled that objective medical tests such as blood sampling and chest x-rays were performed on the patients admitted to Hospital 601 on August 29<sup>th</sup> 2014. Nevertheless, none of the medical records submitted by the Syrian National Authority contained the results of any such diagnostic procedures. This significantly limits our ability to link the clinical picture presented by the patients, to the treatments delivered by the medical personnel, and ultimately, to compare all such findings to those expected after an exposure to a toxic chemical.
32. It is understood that Hospital 601 is operating under crisis conditions, and a sudden influx of a great number of patients displaying these symptoms may have complicated the process of documenting accurately. It must also be taken into consideration that the interviews were performed several months after the incident. In either case, the discrepancy complicates the fact-finding process and prevents the formulation of a confident clinical picture.
33. While it is not our aim to critique possible errors on behalf of fellow medical professionals, such inconsistencies are difficult to overlook when trying to establish a confident, scientifically valid, medical conclusion regarding the possible use of a toxic industrial chemical as a weapon.

#### **CONCLUSION**

34. The combined narratives relayed during the interviews suggest that there was an incident in Jobar, Damascus on the 29<sup>th</sup> of August 2014 at about 6 pm. At that time, a group of approximately 33 Syrian Arab Republic soldiers were in proximity to the impact point of two launched objects which landed within a few minutes of one another. It is possible that upon impact, some kind of airborne irritant was produced which affected those standing close to the points of impact. The irritant appears to have produced significant and varied symptoms. The noted symptoms developed without delay but the effects had a short duration and resolved without antidotes or specific treatments. The described irritant had a very bad smell that most victims either did not recognize sufficiently to describe or were described as the smell of rotten bodies, dead animals, corpses and rotten eggs.

35. Since the incident took place nine months before the mission started, no bio-medical samples were taken and it's therefore very hard to establish which agent could have produced this combined olfactory signature, but some suggestions can be made from the described symptoms. One point that becomes clear when considering the total composition of interviews and medical records is that the substance affecting the soldiers on August 29<sup>th</sup> 2014 was not likely chlorine.

**List of chemicals and the probability analysis:**

Substance	Diborane	Hydrogen Fluoride	Boron Trifluoride	Hydrogen sulphide	Ammonia	Phosgene	Sulphur dioxide	Formaldehyde	Hydrogen bromide	Boron Trichloride	Organophosphate	Chlorine
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**High probability**

**Low probability**

36. The table of substances has been created in consideration of:
- Symptoms
  - Onset and the duration of symptoms
  - The need of specific antidotes or other specific treatments
  - The appearance and the smell of the gas as described
  - Secondary contamination
  - Long term effects
37. According to the description provided by the soldiers the devices which released the chemical substance were detonated outside which indicates that the substance must be highly toxic in order to obtain the concentration needed to cause these dramatic symptoms.
38. As for chlorine, it has a well-known smell recognizable at very low concentration (0,1 - 0,3 ppm) and should most likely have been identified by some of the victims. Neither are the symptoms those of chlorine exposure.
39. As for sarin (GB) or other organic phosphoric compounds (OPs), the smell would not be consistent with the unpleasant signature of rotting corpses or eggs, since the smell of sarin is most frequently described as a sweet smell of apple or pear. The symptoms would likewise be different and there would almost certainly be secondary contamination among first responders and medical staff. Finally, the victims would be

affected far more severely and for a much longer duration if exposed to sarin or other OPs especially if no specific antidote was given.

40. Of particular interest is the possibility of the soldiers having been exposed to diBorane, which in addition to being traditionally used as a rocket propellant, in the electronic industries and is also used in the vulcanization of rubber, making it both relevant to the interests of a militarized non-state actor, and also readily available in the region. It is a substance which could be causative of most of the presented symptoms and is associated with a rapid recovery without any antidotes or specific treatments when patients are removed to fresh air. While diBorane is highly toxic, it is non-persistent, volatile and would not likely cause secondary contamination.
41. As far as the olfactory signature is concerned, the smell of diBorane is described in research literature as having a repulsive, sickly sweet odour which could very well be compared to the smell of rotting dead bodies.
42. Our list of potential chemical agents is presented for reference and consideration but should not be considered a conclusion, as the objective evidence required to reach confidence is lacking in this case. With respect to the questions proposed in the mandate, it is the opinion of the mission that the substance most likely attributable to the clinical presentations described in the interviews and records is not chlorine or sarin.
43. This medical report is hereby submitted on 29 June 2015.

## Annex 2

### EXTRACT FROM INTERVIEW ANALYSIS (JOBBER INCIDENT- 29 AUGUST 2014)

Interview Compilation Table FFM-Bravo					
DCN:		Substantive Responses (Out of 20)	Prevailing Narrative	Narrative Departures	Corroboration of Other Sources
Interviewee Role					
Pre-Incident					
Description of:	Task objective	19 (95%)	Prior to the event the unit was either advancing or preparing to advance on a building or group of buildings held by an opposition group.	While references to a 'soap factory' were common, there was some disagreement with respect to how this factory figured into the operation. Some respondents noted it as an inconsequential landmark, others describe it as the unit's point of origin (U8)(S8)(Q10), others described it as an obstacle they had to navigate around while en route (P9)(R11), and still others describe it as the objective itself (F7)(I8).	N/A
	Starting point	20 (100%)	There is near consensus that the operation began in Jobar, in the vicinity of the 'soap factory' and some 'Arabic style houses' of varying size.	Described distance from the soap factory at the outset of the operation varied from 30m (T8) to 300m (E8), with multiple variants. Some ambiguity noted as to whether or not the Arabic style houses were the target, or whether they were just part of the landscape (Q9).	Multiple image files on CD1 supplied by SAR indicate the soap factory at or near 30°N 36 19'E, however open source maps label the same structure as a 'meat market'. Another structure adjacent to this meat market may be the actual soap factory but no open sources can confirm this.
	Direction of Travel	10 (50%)	The most common direction noted was 'east', though most respondents did not relay any specific direction. The most prevalent general term was 'toward the target', though whether this was house to house (Y9), across a street (U9)(N9) or on the other side of the soap factory (P9) is not clear.	While there were a variety of movement descriptions (i.e. 'across the street vs. house to house') such variations may or may not be inconsistencies. This is difficult to determine without a physical picture of the incident area.	N/A
	Method of Travel	13 (65%)	A clear majority of respondents report moving on foot at the time of the incident, though some mention having arrived at the point of origin by vehicle.	None of note	N/A
	Group Composition	20 (100%)	The unit consisted of 30-35 men.	No departures on the total number, though the outlier narratives depart dramatically from the main body of soldier interviews.	The number of medical records submitted and the "Report of Commander- Bigade 358 - Special Units" match the prevailing narrative.
	Position of His Sub-Group	20 (100%)	The general picture is that of the 30-35 troops arranged in sub-groups (teams) of approximately 5-7 men per team. Responses indicate that some of the teams were inside buildings at the time of the incident and others were located around buildings or in the street (S11). The OIC of the unit places himself in the second floor of a building with two attendants, maintaining visibility on the area of operations (E12).	The combined responses create a complex picture that is difficult to clarify without precisely located buildings and streets, but this is not necessarily an inconsistency. Likewise, the tendency of multiple respondents describing themselves as having been in the "first group" (F12)(U12)(Q24) or on the "front line" (J12) or "most advanced" (R12)(S12) supposes that each of these men was actually in the same, forward sub-group. While that is a difficult point to corroborate, it is not necessarily implausible. More challenging is the reconciliation of the OIC's description of his location (E12) vs. the several other descriptions of his location according to other interviewees (M12)(N12)(P12)(I11)(Q20). The aforementioned suggests that the OIC was in a second floor observation position, while the others place him among the 30+ or with a sub-group.	N/A

**Annex 3**

**LIST OF MATERIALS GATHERED DURING THE INTERVIEW PROCESS**

No.	Date of origin	Document Control Number	Evidence Reference No.	Material Title	No. of pages/items
1	01/06/2015	FFM/003/15/6181/032	20150601200001	Audio recording of interview	01 SD card
2			20150601200002	Video recording of interview	01 SD card
3			20150601200003	Drawing of alleged incident area (by interviewee)	01 page
4			20150601200004	Digital copy of medical records	01 SD card
5		FFM/003/15/6181/032	20150601200101	Audio recording of interview	01 SD card
6			20150601200102	Video recording of interview	01 SD card
7			20150601200103	Digital copy of medical records	01 SD card
8		FFM/003/15/6181/032	20150601200201	Audio recording of interview	01 SD card
9			20150601200202	Video recording of interview	01 SD card
10			20150601200203	Drawing of explosive (by interviewee)	01 page
11			20150601200204	Digital copy and hardcopy of medical record	01 SD card / 03 pages
12		FFM/003/15/6181/032	20150601200301	Audio recording of interview	01 SD card
13			20150601200302	Video recording of interview	01 SD card
14			20150601200303	Digital copy and hardcopy of medical record	01 SD card / 03 pages
15		FFM/003/15/6181/032	20150601200401	Audio recording of interview	01 SD card
16			20150601200402	Video recording of interview	01 SD card
17			20150601200403	Audio recording of interview	01 SD card
18			20150601200404	Digital copy of medical records	01 SD card
19	02/06/2015	FFM/003/15/6181/032	20150602200501	Audio recording of interview	01 SD card
20			20150602200502	Digital copy and hardcopy of medical record	01 SD card / 3 pages
21			20150602200503	Video recording of interview	01 SD card
22		FFM/003/15/6181/032	20150602200601	Video recording of interview	01 SD card
23			20150602200602	Audio recording of interview	01 SD card
24			20150602200603	Digital copy of medical records	01 SD card
25		FFM/003/15/6181/032	20150602200701	Drawing of map and object (by interviewee)	02 pages
26			20150602200702	Video recording of interview	01 SD card


No.	Date of origin	Document Control Number	Evidence Reference No.	Material Title	No. of pages/items
27		FFM/003/15/6181/032	20150602200703	Audio recording of interview	01 SD card
28			20150602200704	Digital copy of medical records	01 SD card
29			20150602200801	Audio recording of interview	01 SD card
30			20150602200802	Video recording of interview	01 SD card
31			20150602200803	Digital copy and hardcopy of medical record	01 SD card / 3 pages
32	03/06/2015	FFM/003/15/6181/032	20150603200901	Audio recording of interview	01 SD card
33			20150603200902	Video recording of interview	01 SD card
34			20150603200903	Digital copy of medical records	01 SD card
35		FFM/003/15/6181/032	20150603201001	Audio recording of interview	01 SD card
36			20150603201002	Video recording of interview	01 SD card
37		06/06/2015	FFM/003/15/6181/032	20150606201101	Audio recording of interview
38	20150606201102			Video recording of interview	01 SD card
39	20150606201103			Digital copy of medical records	01 SD card
40	FFM/003/15/6181/032		20150606201201	Audio recording of interview	01 SD card
41			20150606201202	Video recording of interview	01 SD card
42			20150606201203	Drawing/marketing of map (by interviewee)	04 pages
43	07/06/2015	FFM/003/15/6181/032	20150607201301	Video recording of interview	01 SD card
44			20150607201302	Audio recording of interview	01 SD card
45		FFM/003/15/6181/032	20150607201401	Audio recording of interview	01 SD card
46			20150607201402	Video recording of interview	01 SD card
47		FFM/003/15/6181/032	20150607201501	Video recording of interview	01 SD card
48			20150607201502	Audio recording of interview	01 SD card
49	08/06/2015	FFM/003/15/6181/032	20150608201601	Video recording of interview	01 SD card
50			20150608201602	Audio recording of interview	01 SD card
51		FFM/003/15/6181/032	20150608201701	Audio recording of interview	01 SD card
52			20150608201702	Video recording of interview	01 SD card
53	01/06/2015	FFM/003/15/6181/033	20150601400001	Drawing of map (by interviewee)	01 page
54			20150601400002	Audio recording of interview	01 SD card
55			20150601400003	Video recording of interview	01 SD card
56			20150601400004	Digital copy and hardcopy of medical record	1 SD / 03 pages

No.	Date of origin	Document Control Number	Evidence Reference No.	Material Title	No. of pages/items	
57	02/06/2015	FFM/003/15/6181/033	20150601400101	Drawing of map (by interviewee)	02 pages	
58			20150601400102	Audio recording of interview	01 SD card	
59			20150601400103	Digital copy and hardcopy of medical record	01 SD card / 03 pages	
60			20150601400104	Video recording of interview	01 SD card	
61		FFM/003/15/6181/033	20150601400201	Drawing of map (by interviewee)	01 page	
62			20150601400202	Audio recording of interview	01 SD card	
63			20150601400203	Video recording of interview	01 SD card	
64			20150601400204	Digital copy and hardcopy of medical record	01 SD card / 03 pages	
65		FFM/003/15/6181/033	20150601400301	Drawing of map (by interviewee)	01 page	
66			20150601400302	Audio recording of interview	01 SD card	
67			20150601400303	Video recording of interview	01 SD card	
68		02/06/2015	FFM/003/15/6181/033	20150602400401	Audio recording of interview	01 SD card
69				20150602400402	Video recording of interview	01 SD card
70				20150602400403	Digital copy and hardcopy of medical record	03 pages / 1 SD card
71			FFM/003/15/6181/033	20150602400501	Audio recording of interview	01 SD card
72				20150602400502	Video recording of interview	01 SD card
73				20150602400503	Digital copy of medical records	01 SD card
74	FFM/003/15/6181/033		20150602400601	Video recording of interview (part 1)	01 SD card	
75			20150602400602	Audio recording of interview	01 SD card	
76			20150602400603	Digital copy of medical records	01 SD card / 3 pages	
77			20150602400604	Video recording of interview (part 2)	01 SD card	
78	FFM/003/15/6181/033		20150602400701	Written Statement of the witness	04 pages	
79			20150602400703	Digital copy of medical records	01 SD card	
80	FFM/003/15/6181/033		20150602400801	Audio recording of interview	01 SD card	
81			20150602400802	Video recording of interview (part 1)	01 SD card	
82			20150602400803	Digital copy of medical records	01 SD card	
83			20150602400804	Drawing of the alleged incident area (interviewee)	01 page	
84			20150602400805	Video recording of interview (part 2)	01 SD card	
85	03/06/2015	FFM/003/15/6181/033	20150603400901	Audio recording of interview	01 SD card	

No.	Date of origin	Document Control Number	Evidence Reference No.	Material Title	No. of pages/items	
86			20150603400902	Video recording of interview	01 SD card	
87			20150603400903	Digital copy of medical records	01 SD card	
88			FFM/003/15/6181/033	20150603401001	Audio recording of interview	01 SD card
89				20150603401002	Video recording of interview	01 SD card
90	06/06/2015	FFM/003/15/6181/033	20150606401101	Video recording of interview	01 SD card	
91			20150606401102	Audio recording of interview	01 SD card	
92		FFM/003/15/6181/033	20150606401201	Video recording of interview	01 SD card	
93			20150606401202	Audio recording of interview	01 SD card	
94		FFM/003/15/6181/033	20150606401301	Video recording of interview	01 SD card	
95			20150606401302	Audio recording of interview	01 SD card	
96		FFM/003/15/6181/033	20150606401401	Video recording of interview	01 SD card	
97			20150606401402	Audio recording of interview	01 SD card	
98		07/06/2015	FFM/003/15/6181/033	20150607401501	Video recording of interview	01 SD card
99				20150607401502	Audio recording of interview	01 SD card
100	FFM/003/15/6181/033		20150607401601	Video recording of interview	01 SD card	
101			20150607401602	Audio recording of interview	01 SD card	
102	FFM/003/15/6181/033		20150607401701	Video recording of interview	01 SD card	
103			20150607401702	Audio recording of interview	01 SD card	
104	08/06/2015	FFM/003/15/6181/033	20150608401801	Video recording of interview	01 SD card	
105			20150608401802	Audio recording of interview	01 SD card	
106		FFM/003/15/6181/033	20150608401901	Video recording of interview	01 SD card	
107			20150608401902	Audio recording of interview	01 SD card	

Annex 4

ONE IMAGE FROM THOSE PROVIDED BY SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC  
RELATED TO THE ALLEGED INCIDENT IN JOBER ON 29 AUGUST 2014



**Annex 5****ADMINISTRATIVE DATA**

- 5.1 Name, precise location, address and geographical co-ordinates of the investigated area(s)

Damascus area, Syrian Arab Republic

- 5.2 Team Composition

First Deployment to Syrian Arab Republic – Advance Team

<b>No.</b>	<b>Function</b>	<b>Speciality</b>
1.	Steve Wallis, Team Leader	Advance Health and Safety Specialist Inspector
2.	Health and Safety Officer	Advance Health and Safety Specialist Inspector
3.	Chemical Demilitarisation Officer	Chemical Production Technologist
4.	Interview sub-team member, confidentiality Officer	Analytical Chemist Inspector

First Deployment to Syrian Arab Republic – the Main Body of the Fact-Finding Mission

<b>No.</b>	<b>Function</b>	<b>Speciality</b>
1.	Deputy Team Leader	Chemical Weapons Munition Specialist Inspector
2.	Interview sub-team member	Chemical Weapons Munition Specialist Inspector
3.	Interview sub-team member	Advance Health and Safety Specialist Inspector
4.	Interview sub-team member, evidence management officer	Analytical Chemist Inspector
5.	Interview sub-team member	Technical Expert, Medical Doctor
6.	Interview sub-team member	Technical Expert, Medical Doctor
7.	Interpreter	N/A
8.	Interpreter	N/A
9.	Interpreter	N/A

## Second Deployment to the Syrian Arab Republic

<b>No.</b>	<b>Function</b>	<b>Speciality</b>
1.	Steve Wallis, Team Leader	Inspector, Advance Health and Safety Specialist
2.	Deputy Team Leader	Inspector, Chemical Weapons Munitions Specialist
3.	Interview sub-team member, evidence management officer	Inspector, Analytical Chemist
4.	Interview sub-team member	Inspector, Advance Health and Safety Specialist
5.	Interview sub-team member	Inspector, Advance Health and Safety Specialist
6.	Interview sub-team member, confidentiality Officer	Inspector, Analytical Chemist
7.	Interview sub-team member	Inspector, Analytical Chemist
8.	Interview sub-team member, team Logistics Officer	Inspector, Chemical Weapons Munitions Specialist
9.	Interview sub-team member	Technical Expert, Medical Doctor
10.	Interview sub-team member	Technical Expert, Medical Doctor
11.	Interpreter	N/A
12.	Interpreter	N/A
13.	Interpreter	N/A

## Third Deployment to the Syrian Arab Republic

<b>No.</b>	<b>Function</b>	<b>Speciality</b>
1.	Team Leader	Inspector, Advance Health and Safety Specialist
2.	Deputy Team Leader	Inspector, Analytical Chemist
3.	Interpreter	N/A

**Annex 6****SEQUENCE OF EVENTS – DATES AND TIMES**

	<b>Event</b>	<b>Date</b>
a	Receipt of Note Verbale 150 by the OPCW Secretariat, providing information on incidents of the alleged use of chlorine as a weapon.	19/12/2014
b	Agreement on Terms of Reference for the OPCW Fact Finding Mission	10/03/2015
c	Appointment of FFM mission leader, deputy mission leader and mission team	24/03/2015
d	FFM received consent to deploy from Syrian Arab Republic	20/05/2015
e	Deployment of FFM Advance Team to Syrian Arab Republic	25/05/2015
f	Deployment of FFM Main Body to Syrian Arab Republic	29/05/2015
g	Receipt of Note Verbale 41 by the OPCW Secretariat, providing information on incidents of the alleged use of toxic chemicals as a weapon.	29/05/2015
h	Receipt of Note Verbale 43 by the OPCW Secretariat, providing information on incidents of the alleged use of toxic chemicals as a weapon.	03/06/2015
i	Return of FFM Main Body to OPCW head quarters	10/06/2015
j	Return of FFM Advance Team to OPCW head quarters	15/06/2015
k	Receipt of Note Verbale 47 by the OPCW Secretariat, providing information on incidents of the alleged use of toxic chemicals as a weapon.	15/06/2015
l	Second Deployment of FFM to Syrian Arab Republic	01/08/2015
m	Return of FFM to OPCW head quarters	16/08/2015
n	Third deployment of FFM to Syrian Arab Republic	13/10/2015
o	Return of FFM to OPCW head quarters	16/10/2015
p	Submission of FFM report	22/10/2015

**Annex 7****LIST OF OTHER DOCUMENTS PROVIDED BY THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC**

<b>Description of Record</b>	<b>Provided On</b>	<b>Comments</b>
List of patients for interview	31/05/2015	Casualties from alleged incident in Jober 29/08/2014
Description of incident in Darayya on 22/12/2012	08/06/15	Description of an alleged incident which took place on 22/12/2012 in Darayya, which led to the death of seven soldiers after being exposed to a yellow gas.
Intercepted Telecommunication Message on the Attack Against Ghanto	08/06/15	Transcription of text messages related to arrival of chlorine barrels to the Ghanto village
Hamah Radio Conversation	08/06/15	Transcription of radio conversation dated 30/05/14 about attacking Al-Lataminah
Report from Ministry of Water Resources	08/06/15	Report on the theft of stolen equipment and chlorine drums from water pumping units.
Document about an individual belonging to the Al Nusra front	08/06/15	Biography and speech by an Al Nusra front individual
Articles and Media Reports on Chemicals in Syria	08/06/15	Various open source articles and news reports regarding chemical weapons in Syria and region
Video of various executions	12/08/2015	Unrelated to the FFM's investigation

**Annex 8**

**LIST OF REFERENCES**

QDOC/INS/SOP/IAU01 – Standard Operating Procedure for Evidence Collection, Documentation, Chain-of-Custody and Preservation during an Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons

QDOC/INS/SOP/IAU02 – Standard Operating Procedure Investigation of Alleged Use (IAU) Operations

QDOC/INS/WI/IAU01 – Work Instruction for Command Post Operations during an Investigation of Alleged use of Chemical Weapons

QDOC/INS/WI/IAU03 – Working Instruction for Reconnaissance and Search Operation during an Investigation of Alleged Use

QDOC/INS/WI/IAU04 – Work Instruction for the Collection of Biomedical Samples during an Investigation of Alleged Use

QDOC/INS/WI/IAU05 – Work Instruction for Conducting Interviews of Witnesses during an Investigation of Alleged Use

Manual of Confidentiality Procedure

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