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# The CWC Viewed as a Deproliferation Regime

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## **1. CWW Proliferation: A Critical Appraisal of the Phenomenon**

Over the past decade, the international community has adopted a two-pronged approach to the prevention of chemical warfare (CW). On the one hand, it has agreed on a global disarmament treaty, the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and on the other, it is seeking to establish an as wide as possible multilateral nonproliferation regime based on national export-control regulations of participating states. In addition, in its January 1992 summit session, the United Nations Security Council declared the proliferation of chemical-warfare weapons (CWW)<sup>1</sup>—as well as other unconventional types of weaponry—to be a threat to international peace and security, thus creating the opening for legal justification of military intervention against such developments.<sup>2</sup>

The two-pronged strategy originated within the United States early in 1984 as a steady stream of reports, eventually confirmed by the United Nations, pointed to the systematic use of CW agents in the Iran-Iraq war. First, the Reagan administration submitted 5 chemicals to an export-control list and started consultations with its allies in an effort to establish a multilateral nonproliferation regime. This led to the creation of the Australia Group, an informal consultative body in which the participating Western industrialized states exchange information and coordinate export-control measures. The members of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA or Comecon) followed suit. The Australia Group gradually expanded the list of chemicals, moved into the area of biological warfare (BW), and began to occupy itself with technologies needed for the production of CW and BW agents. Concrete enforcement, however, required national legislation and some states clearly took different attitudes to the urgency and diligence as regards implementation. Second, in an attempt to revitalize the flagging negotiations at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, then Vice-President Bush submitted a draft CW disarmament treaty based on stringent verification procedures in April 1984. The document laid the foundations for the CWC.

Today, despite the fact that some articles in the CWC undeniably address the CWW proliferation issue, several, especially Western, industrialized states prefer to maintain a supplementary regime of coordinated export-control regulations. Consequently, non-proliferation and disarmament strategies somehow seem to be incongruous. Both have been presented as rivalling, perhaps as complementary, but hardly ever as coinciding solutions. Initially, little intrinsic conflict existed between nonproliferation and disarmament. They respectively addressed short-term and longer-term security concerns. The former was to

deal with transfers of chemical weaponry to developing countries, whereas the negotiations for a comprehensive treaty were dominated by the East-West standoff.

After the Cold War, a unique situation emerged. For the first time, an active nonproliferation regime co-exists with a global disarmament treaty that provides for far-reaching and intrusive verification to ensure compliance. This situation is unique not only to the class of CWW, but also to the history of CW. Since the 1899 Hague Peace Conference, efforts to prevent CW either aimed at banning the use of chemical weapons or sought to obstruct plans by non-possessors to acquire them. However, the respective policy options succeeded each other as the goals of the alternative proved unattainable.

Because of this coincidence, CWW proliferation and CWW armament are perceived to be different issues. Proliferation is habitually presented as an unstoppable lateral spread from a centre to a periphery. What actually constitutes proliferation, or more precisely, what causes the security threat is far less clear. Indeed, a historical overview will reveal that the notion of CWW proliferation may refer to different things depending on the era, the actors and the geopolitical context.

By contraries, viewed from the demand side, the quest for a CW capability is but an armament dynamic in which the proliferant state encounters a major barrier in its material base, such as an insufficiently developed scientific, technological, or industrial base, or lack of key raw materials. In other words, the importation of the required commodities is but one—albeit possibly the fastest—way of structuring the armament dynamic. Proliferation thus deals less with the transfer of these commodities than with the organization of the domestic political and military decision processes and their implementation. Elsewhere, we advanced the following definition based on these considerations:

CWW proliferation occurs when a political entity decides to acquire a CW capability where such a capability does not yet exist provided this decision is followed by a CWW armament dynamic.

CWW deproliferation occurs as soon as the political commitment to that decision ceases to be renewed or if that political entity explicitly reverses that decision.<sup>3</sup>

Under this definition, implementation of the CWC will result in deproliferation, that is, in the reversal of domestic armament dynamics. Accession and ratification constitute an unequivocal decision by a state party possessing or in the process of acquiring CWW to abandon any intent of using, or further developing, producing, and stocking such weapons. Moreover, the fresh international norm may contribute to deproliferation in non-state parties

by weakening political commitments to CW armament programmes. The treaty also proscribes rules of conduct for states parties regarding non-states parties, which, *inter alia*, forbid any assistance in a CW armament programme.

On the other hand, the CWC wishes to abolish any inequalities inherent in export control systems between member states and to enhance their economic and technological development without any discrimination. It therefore comes as little surprise that the treaty contains many references directly or indirectly related to CWW proliferation. In other words, it is not inconceivable to view disarmament and nonproliferation as coinciding policies offering guarantees of security and legitimate economic development to all parties involved.

## **2. The CWC: Wither CWW Proliferation?**

The function of the CWC, however, is open to diverging views. Some see the treaty as addressing security issues, such as proliferation, others consider it as a treaty for development, while yet another group treats it as an instrument to facilitate the trade in chemicals and technology.<sup>4</sup> Some Western states reject the position that the CWC's resolution of certain security concerns should be linked to programs supporting economic and technological development in the field of chemistry. In particular, they are reluctant to abolish other existing CWW nonproliferation regimes until they are satisfied that suspected proliferators are complying with the Convention. They base their position on the argument that Article I, which prohibits each state party "to assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity" outlawed under the Convention, takes precedence over Article XI, which states that states parties shall "not maintain among themselves any restrictions, including those in international agreements, incompatible with the obligations undertaken under this Convention, which would restrict or impede trade and the development and promotion of scientific and technological knowledge in the field of chemistry for industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes." The paragraph's chapeau sentence, however, qualifies the latter stipulation by placing it the context of the CWC's other provisions and "the principles and applicable rules of international law," apparently giving the Western position added credibility.<sup>5</sup>

In other words, the presumption of CWW proliferation may trigger preventive action such as the restriction of trade relationships in order not to assist in a prohibited activity.

The position, however, suffers from a clear definition of proliferation and criteria by which a state can be deemed a proliferator. In addition, it is unclear who will certify a state party's compliance with the Convention, namely some major power unilaterally or the OPCW? It furthermore seems to doubt the efficacy of the CWC's verification and reporting mechanisms. Consequently, the position may introduce a new line of discrimination between those countries already possessing an advanced chemical industrial base and those still developing it. As such, it echoes many an argument about the equity of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Australia Group trade restrictions on implements with potential use for biological warfare has created a similar controversy. Article X of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) grants states parties the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes, while the Convention must also be applied in such a way that it does not hamper their economic and technological development. Support for the additional export controls, however, may be derived from Article III, which prohibits states parties from transferring to any recipient whatsoever any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or delivery means specified in Article I. The opposing views regarding the implementation of Article XI of the CWC thus risks to create another fault line between North and South. The attitude can act as a disincentive to many governments for joining the CWC treaty regime.<sup>6</sup> The lack of universality can consequently lead to failure of the CWC's major aim: offering enhanced security to the global community. As part of a self-fulfilling prophesy, this can in turn lead to further justification of the need for export control-based nonproliferation strategies.

### **3. The Security Dilemma Faced by CWC States Parties**

The problem, however, is far more complex than the North-South paradigm might suggest. Abiding by the CWC can place any country—whether developing or industrialized—in an acute security dilemma. Each state party commits itself individually to the treaty regime and not to other states, irrespective of whether these have acceded to the CWC or not. It renounces CW under all circumstances, including in-kind retaliation. It even agrees to desist from a CW deterrence posture. A treaty violation or a chemical threat by a non-

state party will consequently create a highly asymmetrical security condition, whereby the appropriate response must be sought in alternative measures.

One factor, which undoubtedly plays an important role in the Western understanding of the CWC's role, is the ideological perception of the value of international cooperation and organizations in providing adequate security for states. International cooperation and organizations have come under attack from several quarters, most notably from realist and neorealist schools of thought and their advocates in policy circles.

Second, as a consequence of the Cold War, industrialized nations have formed formal international security structures. In these cases all participants, except for the hegemon, have adopted a common security policy instead of absolute self-reliance. Remarkably, these nations, again except the hegemon, abandoned their CW armament programmes in the process.<sup>7</sup> The emergence of new CWW powers, often hostile to Western interests, thus creates a fresh security dilemma in the West's view. The CWC cannot address this security problem immediately as it places all states parties in this security dilemma.

Third, as noted earlier, trade restrictions and disarmament are now competing policies options. CWW are caught up together with biological and nuclear weapons, and missiles, in comprehensive nonproliferation and counterproliferation policies, which makes them difficult to extract in spite of the CWC. This becomes even more difficult in view of the second point above.

#### **4. The CWC's Response: Article X**

The CWC nonetheless provides for a range of remedying or preventive actions. For instance, it explicitly authorizes states parties to equip themselves with the most efficient protection against CW agents.<sup>8</sup> As a CW agent affects its target through environmental mediation, interposing a barrier will significantly reduce any military advantage an attacker might hope to gain from CWW use and thus diminish the attraction of CWW for potential proliferators.<sup>9</sup> Put differently, the costs for an attacker with CWW against a protected target in terms of amount of agent required, logistical burden, and preparations, may be both broad and unacceptably high.<sup>10</sup> This relative advantage of defence over offense is one characteristic of CW that had become apparent during World War 1. A corollary is of course that CW agents will prove most effective against unprotected troops and populations, a condition

most likely to be encountered in poorer developing countries. Encouraging the proliferation of CW defences, either as direct aid or as access to relevant knowledge or technology to stimulate domestic production, may therefore raise the military opportunity costs sufficiently to render CW unattractive. Article X, §§ 1, 2, and 3 of the CWC envisage such arrangements. CW defences are viewed as an essential component of the treaty for three reasons:

- ▶ Verification will become much easier because the stocks necessary to overcome the defences will have to be much larger if an important chemical attack is planned.
- ▶ The knowledge that chemical defences decrease the effectiveness of a chemical attack significantly will reduce an incentive to violate the treaty provisions.
- ▶ Chemical defences will always limit the damage in case the treaty-imposed constraints break down.<sup>11</sup>

Moreover, to redress an imbalance, Article X, §8 stipulates that each state party has the right to request and receive assistance and protection against the use or threat of use of chemical weapons. In this way, Article X contributes to the goal of universality by assisting those states parties not in a position to acquire protection for themselves.<sup>12</sup>

In other words, Article X and related provisions in the CWC make up powerful disincentives for potential proliferators, but derive their force from the Convention's overall prohibition of CW. Moreover, as the requests for assistance and protection have to be made through the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), established under the CWC, a guarantee for universal application has been built in. By itself, the proliferation of defences and protection against CW does not offer an alternative to global disarmament and only holds limited value as a disincentive against proliferation because many countries do not have an indigenous development and production capability for CW defences and may not enjoy the support of a hegemon.

## **5. The CWC's Response: Article XI**

The CWC also addresses the issue of the transfer of chemicals amongst states parties and between states parties and non-states parties. It attempts to meet proliferation concerns while guaranteeing states parties equal access to chemical compounds and technologies. In the past, the inability to distinguish unambiguously between chemicals used as warfare agents and those that have peaceful industrial purposes rendered any ban on their trade or transfer impractical because of the impossibility to verify the end use in the recipient state. Moreover, it was recognized, the measure was discriminatory as those powers already in the possession of an advanced chemical industry would remain unaffected by the regime and confirm their superiority in chemical armaments. Even if the technical issues could have been resolved, effective implementation of the trade restrictions would have been greatly constrained by short-term security goals. Again, in the absence of a formal global ban on CW, the measures would have had extremely limited impact.<sup>13</sup> Today, it is still impossible to draw a clear line between those chemical compounds and technologies with legitimate civilian application and those required for a CW programme, and therefore to determine which transfers might pose a threat. Moreover, threat assessments are always high in political content, so that a certain transaction between two states might be perceived as more threatening than a similar one between two other countries.

The CWC has worked around the problem in three ways. First, it sets the general nonproliferation context. According to Article I, each state party is expressly forbidden to transfer chemical weapons, directly or indirectly, to other states parties, non-states parties, or sub-national entities (§1.a) under any circumstances. It further disallows any activity that would amount to assisting, encouraging or inducing anyone to engage in any undertaking that contravenes the Convention (§1.d). Certain sections of Article VII aim at preventing re-proliferation in states parties. Specific penal legislation must prevent any natural or legal person to undertake any activity prohibited under the treaty nor can it permit illegal activities on its territory. It also introduces the legal concept of extraterritoriality regarding the activities of a state party's citizens anywhere, even for countries that do not know it in their penal legislation. The formulation is such that it also comprises undertakings in non-states parties. Regarding trade relations, the CWC makes a very sharp distinction between states parties and other countries. Article XI grants states parties overall rights regarding permitted chemical activities and international cooperation among them. By implication, other coun-



tries cannot fully enjoy such rights. The article adds that states parties should review their national trade regulations and make them consistent with the object and purpose of the CWC.

Second, the Convention has categorized chemical compounds of particular concern in schedules depending on their relative importance for the production of CW agents or for legitimate civilian manufacturing processes. Apart from their significance for verification and reporting routines, the three schedules also form the basis of an export control regime amongst states parties and between states parties and non-states parties. The overriding criterion is, of course, that none of the transactions may contravene the basic purpose of the CWC. End use is again the object of routine reporting by the state party's National Authority, or, if the need arises, of verification inspections.<sup>14</sup>

In a nutshell, Schedule 1 chemicals can be transferred between any two States Parties for no other purposes than research, medicine, pharmaceuticals or protection and in quantities defined under the General Provisions of Part VI of the Verification Annex. These chemicals cannot be re-transferred to a third state. Both state parties involved must notify the Technical Secretariat not less than 30 days before any such transfer. Moreover, all states parties have to submit detailed annual reports regarding the transfer of Schedule 1 chemicals to the Technical Secretariat. Three years after the CWC's entry into force, states parties will be allowed to transfer Schedule 2 chemicals only among themselves (Verification Annex, Part VII, C). These transactions, however, are not subjected to stringent quantitative conditions or reporting requirements similar to those for Schedule 1 chemicals. During those three years, states parties may still transfer such chemicals to non-parties if they obtain an end-use certificate specifying *inter alia* the conditions laid down in the article. The transfer of Schedule 3 chemicals is only discussed in relation to non-states parties: there are no quantitative limits, but the exporting state party must ensure that they will not be used for purposes prohibited by the convention and will require an end-use certificate of which the treaty imposes the minimum stipulations. Five years after the CWC's entry into force the Conference of the states parties will consider the need to establish other measures regarding the transfer of Schedule 3 chemicals to non-parties.

Finally, the workability of this schedule-based approach again rests entirely on the global ban of CW and any preparations thereto. Consequently, it becomes possible to distinguish between permitted and prohibited activities and it is no longer necessary to determine the intrinsic threat posed by a chemical compound. Fundamental is that within the restrictions

imposed by the treaty regime all states parties have equal access to these chemicals and other materials. Discrimination only exists with non-state parties and it may be viewed as an added incentive to join the CWC.

The convention thus distinguishes between chemicals listed in the schedules and those that are not.<sup>15</sup> While Article I sets the general context, actual declarations and subsequent verification procedures rest on the schedule system. Consequently, new chemicals which might violate the intent and purpose of the treaty but have been discovered since the conclusion of the negotiations or whose details were withheld during the talks cannot be further researched, developed, produced or deployed under Article I, but do not have to be declared, and are therefore not subject to verification until they are included in one of the schedules. Even if a state party acts in such good faith and reports the existence of this new chemical, still none of the treaty's verification procedures can be applied. The question became acute after Russian scientists Mirzayanov and Fyodorov revealed that Moscow was developing a new nerve gas, codenamed *novichok* [newcomer] and reportedly ten times as poisonous as VX. There is still speculation about the agent's chemical structure. According to Mirzayanov, the precursors are not included in the CWC schedules, nor did President Yeltsin add them to the list of compounds requiring export licenses.<sup>16</sup>

The application of Article I to unscheduled chemicals is never in doubt. Export controls can add nothing to the scope of the states parties' commitment never to aid CWW armament programmes in other countries. However, the position raises several practical issues. The availability or the transaction of the chemical cannot be verified. Yet, one of the basic aims of the verification regime is "the control of chemicals deemed to pose a significant risk to the convention."<sup>17</sup> On the other hand, in the highly competitive world of chemical industry, Article I could be applied generically for protectionist reasons, thus defeating the purpose of Article XI and leading to complaints from developing countries similar to those regarding the NPT and the BTWC. An alternate approach could consist of a narrow interpretation by which the treaty-imposed restrictions on the transfers only apply to the scheduled chemicals. This leaves states parties the option to submit these new chemicals to national export controls. However, trying to establish a strong anti-proliferation regime to supplement the CWC will encounter its own set of problems. There is the question of enforcement from a legal point of view and the issue of its applicability in concrete situations. Indeed, if a government objects to illegal transactions, it will intervene with national legal measures. If, however, a government is involved in the proliferation process of another state, then the

international community can only ascertain itself of the true nature of the transaction by demanding an inspection. It is not clear which piece of international legislation may justify such a step. Measures can be enforced among nations willing to subscribe to such an international nonproliferation regime, for example within regional organisations such as the European Union or a framework such as a strengthened Australia Group, but are virtually useless outside them.

The example of the Russian *novichok* makes the issue of unscheduled chemicals less academic. Unless further deliberations on procedures within the competent CWC bodies can close the holes, a theoretical possibility exists that technological developments may erode the treaty regime. Although the placement of new chemicals on a schedule may seriously affect the commercial edge of companies in a highly competitive world, a smooth procedure should be envisaged to amend the schedules at regular intervals. The problem must nevertheless be brought into some perspective. On the one hand, only the leading industrial states now possess the scientific and technology base to conduct sustained advanced research into new toxic compounds. This would suggest that national export legislation, which is far easier to amend than an international treaty, may still have a useful role to play. Coordination within an expanded international framework of supplier states, such as the Australia Group, would enhance the general effect. However, this can only be a temporary solution to reduce time pressure on finding a long-term settlement under the CWC and for which the Australia Group can make its expertise available. On the other hand, the CWC's deproliferation regime will affect the willingness of governments to invest heavily in such research and risk international embarrassment and condemnation if found out. Chances are, therefore, that in future new potential CW agents may be discovered by coincidence rather than as the outcome of years of dedicated investigation. In such a case, national objections to adding that chemical to a schedule may be a lot weaker.

## **6. Concluding Comments**

CWW proliferation as it is discussed today may refer to different processes and security policies depending on the context. National anti-proliferation measures, whether coordinated in an international framework or not, address only these parts of the issue which are readily visible to governments in the industrialised countries, namely the transfer of goods, technology and information to regimes in the developing world. However, increased global access to them and the trivialisation of technology, as well as competing domestic agendas in the

developed world, such as jobs creation or an export-led economic growth, ensure the failure of such policies.

Self-imposed supply-side restrictions to stem the spread of chemical weaponry are but the outcome of incremental policy-making modelled after the NPT regime. The solution has an important impact on the way the problem is viewed and leads to bean-counting exercises, a prerequisite for legitimising the export controls in an environment of free trade ideology. The most important consequence is the disregard of motives of certain regimes to acquire chemical weaponry.

The CWC's confidence in the deproliferation regime is great. By rejecting any hampering of economic and technological development of states parties as well as supporting international cooperation in the field of chemical activities, it stimulates the reproduction of the scientific, technological, and industrial preconditions for CW armament programmes. The convention, therefore, does *not* consider the mere presence of the preconditions for CW armament, such as a sufficiently developed scientific and industrial base, in a particular country as (part of) a threat to international security. This is the logical outcome of the clear policy decision regarding deproliferation states parties have made when acceding to the treaty. It is also a prerequisite for treating countries equally with respect to their economic interests under the CWC regime.

The CWC, as a treaty aiming at deproliferation, holds the best promise for reducing chemical threats worldwide by building an environment of confidence and security. Some of the instruments it will employ, apart from verification, are aid and assistance in the area of CW defences and in case of an attack, and equal access to dual-use chemicals and technologies for all states parties. In that sense, the CWC will influence the demand-side in the proliferation process with positive incentives. Non-proliferation or counter-proliferation policies without a global prohibition on employment may well be a futile endeavour.

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> Chemical-warfare weapons are a subset of chemical weapons consisting of antipersonnel, casualty-causing poison-agent weapons. Excluded are thus flame and smoke, which feature in the definitions advanced in some armed forces manuals, and harassing and antiplant agents. The latter two categories are the subject of officially sanctioned transfers to other states and used for riot-control and law-enforcement (e.g. police interventions during demonstrations or the spraying of coca fields in Latin America).
- <sup>2</sup> *High-Level Meeting of the Security Council: Note by the President of the Security Council on Behalf of the Members*, UN Security Council Document S/23500, January 31, 1992.
- <sup>3</sup> For extensive discussion, see Jean Pascal Zanders, 'Towards Understanding Chemical-Warfare Weapons Proliferation'. *Contemporary Security Policy* 16 (April 1995), pp. 84-110.
- <sup>4</sup> Thomas Stock and Anna De Geer, "Chemical Trade Control and Article XI of the CWC" [<http://www.sipri.se/projects/group-cw/Paper-4.html>]. June 1994.
- <sup>5</sup> Walter Krutzsch and Ralf Trapp, *A Commentary on the Chemical Weapons Convention* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994), pp. 214-215.
- <sup>6</sup> Samir K. Sen, "Controlling Non-nuclear Weapons of Mass Destruction: Problems and Prospects in a Changing World," *Comparative Strategy* 15 (1996), pp. 174-175.
- <sup>7</sup> This trend is certainly observable for the European NATO-member states, many of whom had active CW armament programmes during the *interbellum*. Similarly, if one observes the Gulf region, states that are highly dependent on an outside power (cf. the conservative monarchies) for their security display are far less associated with CWW proliferation than the revolutionary regimes, which seek to meet each security challenge independently. (Jean Pascal Zanders, "Dynamics of Chemical Armament: Towards a Theory of Proliferation," Ph.D diss., Vrije Universiteit Brussel, 1996.)
- <sup>8</sup> For instance, Article II, §9(b), which states that 'protective purposes' are not prohibited under the CWC, Article X, §2, which states that nothing in the CWC will be interpreted as impeding the right of a state party to provide itself with means of protection against chemical weapons, and the Verification Annex, Part VI, §2(a), which allows production, acquisition and retention of Schedule 1 chemicals *inter alia* for protective purposes; §3, which allows the transfer of these chemicals to other states parties for such purposes; §8, which allows for the establishment by a state party of a single small-scale facility for the production of Schedule 1 chemicals for these purposes; and §10, which permits production for protective purposes of Schedule 1 chemicals in aggregate quantities not exceeding 10 kg per year at one facility outside the single small-scale facility.
- <sup>9</sup> See for instance, Herbert C. De Bisschop, 'The Role of Anti-Chemical Protection in Deterrence and the Need for Protection after a Global Chemical Convention' in Jean Pascal Zanders (Ed.), *The 2nd Gulf War and the CBW Threat. Proceedings of the 3rd Annual Conference on Chemical Warfare*. Vredesonderzoek, Special Issue, Interfacultair Overlegorgaan voor Vredesonderzoek, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, November 1995. pp. 165-169.
- <sup>10</sup> J. P. Perry Robinson, 'Chemical-Weapons Proliferation in the Middle East,' in E. Karsh, M. S. Navias and P. Sabin, eds., *Non-Conventional-Weapons Proliferation in the Middle East. Tackling the Spread of Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Capabilities* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p.77.
- <sup>11</sup> C. Moss Helms; M. Meselson; B. Roberts, *Chemical Weapons and Security in the Middle East*. Proceedings from a Congressional Briefing (Washington: Program on Science and International Security, American Association for the Advancement of Science, 11 September 1990). Comments by M. Meselson at p. 24 and B.

Roberts at p. 25.

<sup>12</sup> Krutzsch and Trapp, p. 201.

<sup>13</sup> This particular issue stood central at the 1925 League of Nations Conference to restrain the arms trade and the inability to achieve consensus on a ban on the transfer of implements for CW eventually led to the adoption of the Geneva Protocol. See: *Proceedings of the Conference for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms and Ammunition and in Implements of War. Held at Geneva, May 4th to June 17th, 1925*, League of Nations, Document A. 13. 1925. IX, September 1925.

<sup>14</sup> The relevant passages in the CWC are: Article I, §1(a) and §1(d); Article VI, §2; Article VII, §1(c); and Article XI, §2(e). The schedules are defined in the 'Annex on Chemicals' attached to the CWC. The regimes governing the transfer of chemicals are detailed in the Verification Annex, notably Part VI, B for Schedule 1 chemicals, Part VII, C regarding the transfer of Schedule 2 chemicals to non-state parties, and Part VIII, C regarding the transfer of Schedule 3 chemicals to non-state parties. The import and export of Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals to other states parties are the subject of the initial and annual declarations to be submitted by each state party (Part VII, A and Part VIII, A respectively).

<sup>15</sup> The Australia Group list of CWW precursors and the CWC schedules of chemicals differ in content and purpose which may cause confusion in implementing export controls. For a discussion: R. J. Mathews, 'Comparison of the Australia Group List of Chemical Weapons Precursors and the CWC Schedules of Chemicals.' *Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin*, 21 (September 1993).

<sup>16</sup> For a summary of disclosures: *Arms Control Reporter* (October 1992), p. 704.E-2.67 and May 1993, p. 704.E-2.86.

<sup>17</sup> J. P. Perry Robinson; T. Stock and R. G. Sutherland, 'The Chemical Weapons Convention: The Success of Chemical Disarmament Negotiations'. In: *SIPRI Yearbook*, 1993, p.726.

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**CWC Signatures and Ratifications  
of Mediterranean States**

Situation as of 3 June 1996

(Source: OPCW, [<http://www.opcw.nl/memsta/namelist.htm>])

<b>Countries</b> (Listed from west to east)	<b>Signed</b>	<b>Ratified</b>
<i>Africa</i>		
Morocco	13.01.93	28.12.95
Algeria	13.01.93	14.08.95
Tunisia	13.01.93	
Libya		
Egypt		
<i>Europe</i>		
Spain	13.01.93	03.08.94
France	13.01.93	02.03.95
Italy	13.01.93	08.12.95
Holy See	14.01.93	
Malta	13.01.93	
Slovenia	14.01.93	
Croatia	13.01.93	25.05.95
Bosnia-Herzegovina		
Federated Republic of Yugoslavia		
Albania	14.01.93	11.05.94
Greece	13.01.93	22.12.94
Cyprus	13.01.93	
Turkey	14.01.93	
<i>Levant</i>		
Syria		
Lebanon		
Israel	13.01.93	

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