CBRN Security

Current international security structures

Dr Jean Pascal Zanders
The Trench

Hungarian Institute of International Affairs
CBRN Security Seminar
Budapest, 17 – 18 June 2014
Non-conventional weapon categories

- Biological
- Chemical
- Toxic & Bio-active molecules
- Smoke
- Incendiary
- Radiological
- Nuclear
Main prohibitions against CBW

- **1925 Geneva Protocol**
  - Prohibits the use in war of CBW
  - Marginalised CBW in military doctrine → foundation for disarmament

- **1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)**
  - Comprehensive ban on development, production and possession of BW and toxin weapons

- **1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)**
  - Comprehensive ban on development, production, possession, and use of CW (covers toxin weapons)
Single Integrated Treaty System (SITS)

- Defines the weapon under consideration
  - Demarcates applicability of treaty
  - Lays foundation for the verification system
- Covers all dimensions of the ban on development, acquisition and possession
  - Backward-looking dimension (destruction of weapons & related infrastructure)
  - Forward-looking dimension (prevention of future armament)
  - Application of the General Purpose Criterion in the definition
  - Prohibits use under any and all circumstances
  - Covers inter-state behaviour, as well as terrorism and crime
  - Demands national implementation, including national criminalisation and penalisation of international prohibitions
- Operates tools to enhance transparency, monitor and enforce compliance (incl. verification)
Characteristics of SITS

- **Multilateral → inclusive treaties**
  - Any country can join if it so desires
  - Equal obligations and rights for all parties to the treaty

- **Other issue-specific tools will tend to draw on or reinforce the SITS**
  - UN Secretary-General’s investigative mechanism
  - UNSC Resolution 1540 with regard to CBW
  - Australia Group control lists → from plurilateral tool to increasingly accepted standard for national legislation on CBW
  - Ability for adaptation to special circumstances
    - E.g., OPCW-UN Joint Mission for CW elimination in Syria

- **Ability to build functional lateral links to other treaty systems or international organisations**
  - BTWC → FOA, OIE, WHO
  - CWC / OPCW → UN, WHO
  - CWC – BTWC interaction on science and technology conversion

- **Other institutions will draw on the central prohibitions in SITS to develop own specific actions**
  - E.g., Interpol, WCO, professional and academic associations, etc.
  - Widens and deepens multi-level stakeholdership → reinforcement of the core norm against CBW
Emerging issue areas become integrated into SITS

- Biosecurity & safety in BTWC + development of lateral functional links (WHO)
- Chemical security & safety in CWC
  - Helps to build regional dynamics in support of the convention
  - Overcomes politically sensitive issue of prepositioning emergency assistance equipment in certain regions
  - Supports training, capacity-building and other aspects of international cooperation for peaceful purposes
- Close monitoring of scientific & technological developments

One negotiation; single ratification / accession process

Other institutions will draw on the central prohibitions in SITS to develop own specific actions

- E.g., Interpol, WCO, professional and academic associations, etc.
- Widens and deepens multi-level stakeholdership → reinforcement of the core norm against CBW
Not all SITS are born equal

**CWC**
- OPCW as independent international organisation with Technical Secretariat
- Elaborate verification machinery
- Investigation of alleged CW use

**BTWC**
- Implementation Support Unit, part of UNODA
- Efforts at enhancing transparency
  - Hampered by conviction of unverifiability by some parties
- Rudimentary mechanisms to address compliance concerns
- Call by individual states on UN Secretary-General’s Investigative Mechanism in case of alleged BW use
- No ability to mount a Syria-type disarmament operation
An unfulfilled NW control agenda

  - Negotiate an international non-proliferation agreement
  - Supplement it with:
    - A comprehensive test ban
    - Nuclear free zones
    - Safeguards for programmes for peaceful purposes, and
    - Fissile material controls

- Agenda still not fully achieved, now almost 50 years later
  - Hampered by multiple negotiations; multiple ratification processes in each country
  - Frictions in individual treaty implementation → carried over into parallel forums
Scattered approach in NW control

- No definition of a NW
- No formal prohibition on NW use
- **Multiple additional initiatives, but no integration:**
  - Bilateral treaties (e.g., SALT, INF, START, ...) between USA – USSR/Russia
  - Plurilateral initiatives, often with informal status (technology transfer arrangements, Global Partnership, nuclear security summits, ...)
  - UNSC resolutions (1540, nuclear terrorism, ...)
  - Unilateral drawdown of nuclear forces, but with modernisation of remaining weapon holdings (mostly in terms of delivery systems)
- Radioactive materials: under nuclear umbrella or not?
- What about investigation of (NW; RW) use?
Recalling where science, industry and military art converged
Challenging entrenched positions

www.the-trench.org

E-mail: jpzanders@the-trench.org
Twitter: @JPZanders
Blog: http://www.the-trench.org/blog/