Preventing Next Use

Implications for a New Tier of Technologically Capable States

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Preventing and Mitigating the Next Use of CBW
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The CB threat spectrum

- War scenarios
- Terrorism
- Criminal acts

Consideration of different types of CB agents
- Depends on intent
- Depends on availability
- Depends on level of development, available scientific & technical skills, and preconditions in the material base
  - Weapon acquisition is often correlated to level of technological development
State involvement in CBW programmes

- State programmes
  - Domestic armament programmes
  - Supply of CBW to other states
  - Technology transfers in support of CB programmes in other states
    - Government to government
    - Private entrepreneurs to government
- State sponsorship of CB acquisition by terrorists
- Terrorist sponsorship of state programmes
The armament dynamic (states)
Issues relating to state activities

- Military application of new scientific and technological developments has become commonplace
- Pressures to exploit new developments for military goals will grow
  - Biology and biotechnology / synthetic biology
  - Chemical products (novel toxic compounds) and processes
  - Nanotechnology (agent design; defence and protection)
- Discourse change: many arguments in favour framed in humanitarian terms (e.g., so-called non-lethal weaponry)
- Development of rationale for defence programmes
  - Protection, detection & prophylaxis
  - Science-based threat assessment involving creation of genetically modified agents
  - Study of aerosol techniques and dissemination patterns
General conclusions

- Weapons are not generally available and the acquisition process is complex for the potentially most destructive agents.
- The armament process is not inevitable
  - Promoting factors
  - Counter-acting factors
  - Paradox: some promoting factors may actually contribute to the failure of the CBW acquisition process (impact of feedback loops).
- The ‘lesser’ agents in the armament dynamic
  - They come within the capabilities of more entities (states, groups, individuals)
    - Lower demands on operational guidance
    - Acquisition also less demanding
    - Lower need for functional specialisation
  - Less destructive
  - Economic or environmental targets, assassination, and other more (time-) limited goals
- Novel agents and processes
  - New applications for hostile purposes
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