

Preventing Next Use

*Implications for a New Tier of
Technologically Capable States*

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Preventing and Mitigating the Next Use of CBW

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The CB threat spectrum


- n War scenarios
- n Terrorism
- n Criminal acts

- n Consideration of different types of CB agents
 - n Depends on intent
 - n Depends on availability
 - n Depends on level of development, available scientific & technical skills, and preconditions in the material base
 - n Weapon acquisition is often correlated to level of technological development

State involvement in CBW programmes

- n State programmes
 - n Domestic armament programmes
 - n Supply of CBW to other states
 - n Technology transfers in support of CB programmes in other states
 - n Government to government
 - n Private entrepreneurs to government
- n State sponsorship of CB acquisition by terrorists
- n Terrorist sponsorship of state programmes
 - n 1990s: al Qaeda CW programme in Hilat Koko (Khartoum) allegedly for National Islamic Front for use against insurgents in southern Sudan (Jamal al Fadl testimony, Feb. 2001).

The armament dynamic (states)



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Issues relating to state activities

- n Military application of new scientific and technological developments has become commonplace
- n Pressures to exploit new developments for military goals will grow
 - n Biology and biotechnology / synthetic biology
 - n Chemical products (novel toxic compounds) and processes
 - n Nanotechnology (agent design; defence and protection)
- n Discourse change: many arguments in favour framed in humanitarian terms (e.g., so-called non-lethal weaponry)
- n Development of rationale for defence programmes
 - n Protection, detection & prophylaxis
 - n Science-based threat assessment involving creation of genetically modified agents
 - n Study of aerosol techniques and dissemination patterns

General conclusions

- n Weapons are not generally available and the acquisition process is complex for the potentially most destructive agents
- n The armament process is not inevitable
 - n Promoting factors
 - n Counter-acting factors
 - n Paradox: some promoting factors may actually contribute to the failure of the CBW acquisition process (impact of feedback loops)
- n The 'lesser' agents in the armament dynamic
 - n They come within the capabilities of more entities (states, groups, individuals)
 - n Lower demands on operational guidance
 - n Acquisition also less demanding
 - n Lower need for functional specialisation
 - n Less destructive
 - n Economic or environmental targets, assassination, and other more (time-) limited goals
- n Novel agents and processes
 - n New applications for hostile purposes

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