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Brussels
3-4 February 2012

THE CWC AND FUTURE CHALLENGES FOR DISARMAMENT
Challenges to the CWC

- CWC destruction:
  - Post- April 2012: New phase in life of CWC & OPCW
  - USA and Russia: However, transition not as clear-cut as perhaps assumed by negotiators
  - Now: drawn-out process of moving into post-destruction phase of up to a decade expected
- Perhaps not as definitive a transition as sometimes argued
  - New & modified CW declarations
    - Libya and Iraq
    - Future states parties: Syria and some other ME states may pose challenges
    - ACW; sea-dumped CW (economic exploitation of seabed)
- Threats: terrorism & crime (e.g., drug cartels; violence in social movements, ...)
- Science, technology, novel production techniques, ...
Major challenge: Future governance CWC

- No unified model for governance of weapon control anymore
- States do not drive the processes anymore; they can steer in a limited way
- New stakeholders and security actors
- Increased role of non-state national & transnational actors
- Declining role of states in shaping developments
- Shifting relative balances of powers (economy, politics, military) and multiple power centres
- Geographical decentralisation of business and industry activities
- South-south trade patterns and impact on technology diffusion
- Etc.
My long-term vision for the CWC

CWC/OPCW will primarily undertake the worldwide social shaping of preferences about treaty-relevant technologies and their application
Opening up for wider stakeholdership

- CWC relatively isolated; almost purely intergovernmental
  - Policy of confidentiality → impact on media outreach (e.g., Libya)
  - From start: states parties as sole owners of the treaty
  - Now: more ambiguous: states parties as owners of the OPCW (Ekéus document)
  - In margins: involvement of industry and scientific organisations
  - Contrast with BTWC as outcome of intersessional process: multi-layered networks of states, civil society, international organisations, professional & scientific organisations, etc., plus active interactions within and between layers

- Registered civil society participation in review conferences:
  - NPT (2010): 67 organisations
  - BTWC (2011): 47 organisations (up from 31 in 2006)
  - CWC (2008): 22 organisations
    - Yet OPCW has Media Branch to organise greater exposure; neither NPT nor BTWC (in 2006) had an international organisation
    - However, OPCW is geographically isolated; civil society must come into town

- Purpose of broader stakeholdership
  - Sustaining and widening institutional legitimacy: conduit for CWC ideas, objectives and results to broader audience and vice versa
  - Intellectual input and cooperation in aspects of implementation
  - Transfer of norms to the level of the economic unit; individual actor + new oversight & social control options (relatively weak future industry verification → geared towards detection of state-run CW programmes)

- Problem: pushback against multiple stakeholdership
  - Concept of sovereignty
  - BTWC 7th RevCon; CWC: insistence on ownership by states parties
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- Not a State Party
  - Role by definition limited
  - Post-Lisbon Treaty role and capacities still need to be developed

- Consensus: support
  - Requirement for all members + candidates to be a party and in full compliance with the treaty + additional non-proliferation legislation
  - EU + member states is largest contributor to OPCW budget
  - Joint Actions + destruction assistance to Russia
  - Additional activities (e.g., conference support)

- Should start up of process of promoting wider stakeholdership in the CWC in terms of concept and future implementation
  - future issue for Non-proliferation Consortium to explore?
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