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# NON-CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, MILITARY DOCTRINES & PRECONDITIONS FOR DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL

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# MORE THAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS

## ☺ 'A zone free of nuclear weapons and other WMD'

- É Disarmament initiative comes from the 2010 NPT Review Conference

## ○ Poses major additional problems:

- É Covers different weapon categories
  - ⊕ Nuclear, Biological, Chemical + Delivery systems (missiles)
- É Different weapon categories with similar doctrinal functions
  - ⊕ e.g., strategic deterrence with NW in Israel vs. CW in Syria

## ○ Historical baggage as sources for continuing uncertainty

- É CW were used or threatened in wars among Arabs since WW2
  - ⊕ Egypt in Yemen (1960s)
  - ⊕ Iraq in 1990-91 Gulf War
- É CW by Arabs against non-Arabs
  - ⊕ Iraq against Iran and own Kurdish population in 1980-88 Gulf War
- É Israel: known to have pursued / pursue offensive non-conventional weaponry since 1948
  - ⊕ CW armament in late 1940s and 1950s
  - ⊕ CW used in assassination operations
  - ⊕ El Al plane crash near Amsterdam (1992): 3 of 4 sarin precursors on board
  - ⊕ Uncertainty of BW activities
  - ⊕ Nuclear armed for several decades, but not used to coerce neighbours.
- É Syria: large CW programme, but strategic rationale appears similar to that of Israel's NW

# DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL IN ACTION

- ò Impact on the pursuit of absolute and relative gains
- ò Functional equivalence

# IMPACT OF FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENCE

- Weaponry *in functional equivalence* is characterised by the fact that any change in its constitution in one political entity would be countered by a similar change in an adversarial political entity
  - É Otherwise: relative gain for first political entity
- Conversely, changes in the constitution of weaponry *not in functional equivalence* in one political entity would elicit an asymmetrical or no response from an adversary
- A class of weaponry in functional equivalence between the major political entities concerned *can be isolated as a security issue*

# IMPORTANCE OF FE FOR DISARMAMENT

- Necessary *catalyst* if the security environment is conducive to arms control or disarmament
- Enables the *isolation* of a security issue
- Creates the *context for an absolute gain*, enabling cooperation, because
  - É States respond to attempts to change the status quo with respect to the weaponry under consideration
  - É This response pattern increases the opportunity costs for all parties concerned to maintain the increased capability without necessarily increasing relative security

# MANIFESTATION OF FE

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- ò Presence
- ò Non-existence
- ò Irrelevance
  
- ò Formalised condition of functional equivalence

# PRESENCE OF FE

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- Ability to *isolate* the weaponry as a security issue
- *No further relative gains* in terms of the function of the weaponry is possible
- All parties *can obtain absolute gains* through cooperation in arms control or disarmament
- However, security environment must be *conducive* to such cooperation

# NON-EXISTENCE OF FE

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- Weaponry enters security equation
  - É Only some political entities possess it
  - É Adversaries assigned it a different function in their respective military doctrines
- **Relative gains** calculations; fear of **relative losses**
- **Impossibility to isolate** the weaponry as a security issue
- Preconditions for arms control or disarmament do not materialise



# IRRELEVANCE OF FE

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- The weaponry under consideration *does not enter the security equation* because no state possesses it or fears its use.
- No significant gains
- However, no losses either
  
- Importance of *non-security clauses* in arms control and disarmament treaties

# FORMALISED CONDITION OF FE

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- Uncertainty about the presence of the weapons category
- Uncertainty about the doctrinal function of such weapons
- A *regional subset of states* can conclude a formal agreement renouncing use, possession and acquisition of these weapons
- Risks for joining the arms control or disarmament treaty is equal for all

# EFFECT OF A DISARMAMENT TREATY

- ò Condition of existence → irrelevance
  - É (**Arms control**: *existence* → *existence!*)
- ò Condition of non-existence → non-existence
  - É Hence importance of *positive* security guarantees if a state joins nonetheless
    - e.g., Jordan's accession to CWC (1997)
- ò Condition of irrelevance → irrelevance
  - É Hence importance of non-security clauses
- ò Formalised FE → irrelevance

# MANIFESTATION OF FE IN MIDDLE EAST

## ò Several many-to-one security relationships

- É Consequence of lack of single Arab security institution (GCC being an exception on sub-regional level)

## ò Problem:

- É NW in Israel; status of CBW programmes not 100% transparent
- É CW in Syria
- É Nuclear ambitions in Iran suspect in Israel and many Arab states

# CORE QUESTIONS FOR THE NEW ME PROCESS

- Can the different non-conventional weapon categories be separated from each other?
  - É If so, how does the regional manifestation of functional equivalence affect opportunities for discussion?
  - É At what stage must the different weapon categories be politically brought together again?
  
- Can discussions be organised around weapon arsenals in a functionally equivalent relationship (e.g., NW-CW)?
  - É What about the one-to-many and many-to-many security relationships?
  - É To what extent do security actors and their weaponry from outside the Middle East affect regional security perceptions and expectations?
  
- How do we address specific questions of their delivery systems?
  - É ballistic missiles, but also the current proliferation of anti-ballistic missile defences
  - É other delivery systems, such as planes & rocket, that other doctrinal functions?

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