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CW DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, A BRIDGE CROSSED IN THE PREVENTION OF FUTURE ARMAMENT?

My long-term vision for the CWC

CWC/OPCW will primarily undertake the worldwide social shaping of preferences about treaty-relevant technologies and their application

Future challenge for CWC

§ Disarmament

ú Backward-looking dimension

Destruction of existing stockpiles and weapon-related equipment

Destruction or conversion of production installations and other infrastructure

ú Forward-looking dimension

Prevention of future armament


Governance of relevant dual-use technologies

§ CWC of unlimited duration ≠ perpetual

ú *Challenge*: How can the CWC retain its relevancy for States Parties after destruction of declared CW?

Shifting technology governance requirements & the OPCW

- No unified model for governance of weapon control anymore
- States do not drive the processes anymore; they can steer in a limited way
- New stakeholders and security actors
- Increased role of non-state national & transnational actors
- Declining role of states in shaping developments
- Shifting relative balances of powers (economy, politics, military) and multiple power centres
- Geographical decentralisation of business and industry activities
- South-south trade patterns and impact on technology diffusion
- Etc.



Article XI: yesterday and today

§ Initially rather controversial provision

- ú Cold War actors: emphasis of security dimensions
- ú NAM and other developing countries: emphasis on economic, technological and industrial development
- ú Australia Group as symbol and lightning rod
 - Western states: post-Cold War paradigm shift from disarmament towards non- and counter-proliferation
 - Developing countries:
 - Protectionist measure by industrial states to preserve monopolies
 - Should be fully implemented in light of comprehensive verification

§ Today far less controversial

- ú Globalisation: impact on development
- ú Many states have adopted AG approach to organise technology transfer controls
- ú Technical Secretariat set up (small) programmes that helped States Parties to articulate concrete needs and focus on implementation of proposed programmes
- ú Expansion of OPCW mandate to include chemical safety and security
 - New opportunities for technology transfers
 - Concrete link to Article X

Article XI: the future

§ OPCW will remain seized by the provision after CW destruction

- ú Article VI: transfers of toxic chemicals and their verification
Major advantage over the BTWC, which has no such provision
- ú Article VIII, para. 21(g) : CSP tasked with '*international cooperation for peaceful purposes in the field of chemical activities*' à enables deployment of future activities

§ Prevention of armament: a challenge

ú Verification:

Post-destruction: reduction of inspectors envisaged

Increased emphasis on transfer monitoring (Art. VI):

- Is the current monitoring system adequate to capture the volumes of transfers of toxic chemicals?
- Quid the General Purpose Criterion (vs. scheduled chemicals subject of reporting)?
- Who verifies SP reports?

ú Options:

Modification of reporting requirements and upgrading of monitoring system

Recruitment of more inspectors with proficiency in chemical industry?

Rebalancing functional division between OPCW and States Party responsibilities?

- Enhanced verification responsibilities for States Parties
- Greater lateral interaction among National authorities relating to transfer monitoring
- Reporting to OPCW + auditing process of national reports

§ Art. XI has played a significant role in universalisation through promise of cooperation for peaceful purposes and development

- ú Functional equivalence = irrelevant à primary interest to become a party
- ú Disarmament: FE from existence to irrelevance à continued interest for all SPs

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