CW DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, A BRIDGE CROSSED IN THE PREVENTION OF FUTURE ARMAMENT?

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My long-term vision for the CWC

CWC/OPCW will primarily undertake the worldwide social shaping of preferences about treaty-relevant technologies and their application
Future challenge for CWC

**Disarmament**
- Backward-looking dimension
  - Destruction of existing stockpiles and weapon-related equipment
  - Destruction or conversion of production installations and other infrastructure
- Forward-looking dimension
  - Prevention of future armament
  - Governance of relevant dual-use technologies

**CWC of unlimited duration ≠ perpetual**
- **Challenge:** How can the CWC retain its relevancy for States Parties after destruction of declared CW?
Shifting technology governance requirements & the OPCW

- No unified model for governance of weapon control anymore
- States do not drive the processes anymore; they can steer in a limited way
- New stakeholders and security actors
- Increased role of non-state national & transnational actors
- Declining role of states in shaping developments
- Shifting relative balances of powers (economy, politics, military) and multiple power centres
- Geographical decentralisation of business and industry activities
- South-south trade patterns and impact on technology diffusion
- Etc.
Article XI: yesterday and today

Initially rather controversial provision
- Cold War actors: emphasis of security dimensions
- NAM and other developing countries: emphasis on economic, technological and industrial development
- Australia Group as symbol and lightning rod
  † Western states: post-Cold War paradigm shift from disarmament towards non- and counter-proliferation
  † Developing countries:
    ⊳ Protectionist measure by industrial states to preserve monopolies
    ⊳ Should be fully implemented in light of comprehensive verification

Today far less controversial
- Globalisation: impact on development
- Many states have adopted AG approach to organise technology transfer controls
- Technical Secretariat set up (small) programmes that helped States Parties to articulate concrete needs and focus on implementation of proposed programmes
- Expansion of OPCW mandate to include chemical safety and security
  † New opportunities for technology transfers
  † Concrete link to Article X
Article XI: the future

 OPCW will remain seized by the provision after CW destruction

 - Article VI: transfers of toxic chemicals and their verification
   - Major advantage over the BTWC, which has no such provision
 - Article VIII, para. 21(g): CSP tasked with ‘international cooperation for peaceful purposes in the field of chemical activities’ enables deployment of future activities

 Prevention of armament: a challenge

 - Verification:
   - Post-destruction: reduction of inspectors envisaged
   - Increased emphasis on transfer monitoring (Art. VI):
     - Is the current monitoring system adequate to capture the volumes of transfers of toxic chemicals?
     - Quid the General Purpose Criterion (vs. scheduled chemicals subject of reporting)?
     - Who verifies SP reports?
   - Options:
     - Modification of reporting requirements and upgrading of monitoring system
     - Recruitment of more inspectors with proficiency in chemical industry?
     - Rebalancing functional division between OPCW and States Party responsibilities?
     - Enhanced verification responsibilities for States Parties
     - Greater lateral interaction among National authorities relating to transfer monitoring
     - Reporting to OPCW + auditing process of national reports

 Art. XI has played a significant role in universalisation through promise of cooperation for peaceful purposes and development

 - Functional equivalence = irrelevant primary interest to become a party
 - Disarmament: FE from existence to irrelevance continued interest for all SPs
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