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# **THE FUTURE OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION**




**OFFERING DUAL-USE SECURITY IN A  
MULTI-STAKEHOLDER ENVIRONMENT**

# Future challenges for CWC

- **CWC of unlimited duration  $\neq$  perpetual**
  - *Challenge*: How can the CWC retain its relevancy for States Parties after destruction of declared CW?
- **Disarmament**
  - **Backward-looking dimension**
    - Destruction of existing stockpiles and weapon-related equipment
    - Destruction or conversion of production installations and other infrastructure
  - **Forward-looking dimension**
    - Prevention of future armament
    - Governance of relevant dual-use technologies
- **Transition phase between the two dimensions**
  - **CW destruction deadlines: 2007 / 2012 missed**
  - **Destruction operations in USA & Russia likely until  $\pm$  2012**
  - **10-year transition phase for OPCW to adapt to future challenges**

# The post-proliferation governance challenge

- No unified model for governance of weapon control anymore
- States do not drive the processes anymore; they can steer in a limited way
- New stakeholders and security actors
- Increased role of non-state national & transnational actors
- Declining role of states in shaping developments
- Shifting relative balances of powers (economy, politics, military) and multiple power centres
- Geographical decentralisation of business and industry activities
- South-south trade patterns and impact on technology diffusion
- Etc.



# After CW destruction

- **Centrality of industry activities: production, consumption & trade**
  - **Article XI:** technology transfers, scientific exchanges, & other development cooperation
  - **Article VI:** transfers of toxic chemicals and their verification
  - **Article VIII:** CSP tasked with '*international cooperation for peaceful purposes in the field of chemical activities*' → enables deployment of future activities by OPCW
- **Prevention of armament: a challenge**
  - **Verification:**
    - Post-destruction: reduction of inspectors envisaged
    - Increased emphasis on transfer monitoring (Art. VI):
      - Is the current monitoring system adequate to capture the volumes of transfers of toxic chemicals?
      - Quid the General Purpose Criterion (vs. scheduled chemicals subject of reporting)?
      - Who verifies State Party reports?
  - **Options:**
    - Modification of reporting requirements and upgrading of monitoring system
    - Recruitment of more inspectors with proficiency in chemical industry?
    - Rebalancing functional division between OPCW and States Party responsibilities?
      - Enhanced verification responsibilities for States Parties
      - Greater lateral interaction among National authorities relating to transfer monitoring
      - Reporting to OPCW + auditing process of national reports

# Reaching out to stakeholders

- **Expansion from CW focus to chemical safety & security**
  - Addresses concerns of terrorism, crime or industrial accidents
  - Brings in industry and associated constituencies as partners
  - Adds new layer of information exchanges, and hence transparency and assurance
  - New dimensions of cooperation benefit societies otherwise unconcerned by CW
- **Understanding impact of science and technology developments**
  - Upgrading role and impact of the Scientific Advisory Board (SAB)
  - Broadening of partnerships in assessing SAB recommendations
  - Communication of challenges to CWC to scientific communities & public
- **Reaching out to other civil society constituencies**
  - Independent intellectual input on future governance issues to OPCW
  - Ability to engage in longer-term analysis of issues and emerging challenges
  - However, also need to develop constructive relationships between civil society actors and CWC National Authorities in most countries
    - States will remain primary stakeholders
  - How to universalise civil society contribution to the widening and deepening of the CWC regime?
    - Many state parties view civil society contribution as an instrument to further Western interests
    - Several states view civil society actors as a challenge to government authority and exclusive decision-making authority in security matters

# Stakeholdership & deepening of the norm against CW

*CWC/OPCW will primarily undertake  
the worldwide social shaping of  
preferences about treaty-relevant  
technologies and their application*

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