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THE FUTURE OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
OFFERING DUAL-USE SECURITY IN A MULTI-STAKEHOLDER ENVIRONMENT
Future challenges for CWC

- **CWC of unlimited duration ≠ perpetual**
  - *Challenge*: How can the CWC retain its relevancy for States Parties after destruction of declared CW?

- **Disarmament**
  - Backward-looking dimension
    - Destruction of existing stockpiles and weapon-related equipment
    - Destruction or conversion of production installations and other infrastructure
  - Forward-looking dimension
    - Prevention of future armament
    - Governance of relevant dual-use technologies

- **Transition phase between the two dimensions**
  - *CW destruction deadlines: 2007 / 2012 missed*
  - Destruction operations in USA & Russia likely until ± 2012
  - 10-year transition phase for OPCW to adapt to future challenges
The post-proliferation governance challenge

- No unified model for governance of weapon control anymore
- States do not drive the processes anymore; they can steer in a limited way
- New stakeholders and security actors
- Increased role of non-state national & transnational actors
- Declining role of states in shaping developments
- Shifting relative balances of powers (economy, politics, military) and multiple power centres
- Geographical decentralisation of business and industry activities
- South-south trade patterns and impact on technology diffusion
- Etc.

Processes induced by / impeded by
Decisions shaping / being shaped by processes
After CW destruction

- **Centrality of industry activities: production, consumption & trade**
  - Article XI: technology transfers, scientific exchanges, & other development cooperation
  - Article VI: transfers of toxic chemicals and their verification
  - Article VIII: CSP tasked with ‘international cooperation for peaceful purposes in the field of chemical activities’ → enables deployment of future activities by OPCW

- **Prevention of armament: a challenge**
  - Verification:
    - Post-destruction: reduction of inspectors envisaged
    - Increased emphasis on transfer monitoring (Art. VI):
      - Is the current monitoring system adequate to capture the volumes of transfers of toxic chemicals?
      - Quid the General Purpose Criterion (vs. scheduled chemicals subject of reporting)?
      - Who verifies State Party reports?
  - Options:
    - Modification of reporting requirements and upgrading of monitoring system
    - Recruitment of more inspectors with proficiency in chemical industry?
    - Rebalancing functional division between OPCW and States Party responsibilities?
      - Enhanced verification responsibilities for States Parties
      - Greater lateral interaction among National authorities relating to transfer monitoring
      - Reporting to OPCW + auditing process of national reports
Reaching out to stakeholders

- **Expansion from CW focus to chemical safety & security**
  - Addresses concerns of terrorism, crime or industrial accidents
  - Brings in industry and associated constituencies as partners
  - Adds new layer of information exchanges, and hence transparency and assurance
  - New dimensions of cooperation benefit societies otherwise unconcerned by CW

- **Understanding impact of science and technology developments**
  - Upgrading role and impact of the Scientific Advisory Board (SAB)
  - Broadening of partnerships in assessing SAB recommendations
  - Communication of challenges to CWC to scientific communities & public

- **Reaching out to other civil society constituencies**
  - Independent intellectual input on future governance issues to OPCW
  - Ability to engage in longer-term analysis of issues and emerging challenges
  - However, also need to develop constructive relationships between civil society actors and CWC National Authorities in most countries
    - States will remain primary stakeholders
  - How to universalise civil society contribution to the widening and deepening of the CWC regime?
    - Many state parties view civil society contribution as an instrument to further Western interests
    - Several states view civil society actors as a challenge to government authority and exclusive decision-making authority in security matters
Stakeholdership & deepening of the norm against CW

CWC/OPCW will primarily undertake the worldwide social shaping of preferences about treaty-relevant technologies and their application
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