

# Middle East Disarmament

## *Contribution and limitations of the CWC*

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Seminar in support of a WMDFZ in the Middle East

Brussels, 5-6 November 2012

# The CWC: An obvious starting point

- **Most comprehensive disarmament treaty**
  - Orders destruction of existing CW stockpiles and related facilities and equipment
  - Full-scope prohibition on present and future CW acquisition and use
    - General purpose criterion covers all toxic chemicals, present and future
  - Elaborate verification machinery
  - Many internal processes for conflict resolution before resorting to UNSC
- **Compromise between:**
  - Interests of individual states
  - Chemical Industry
  - Available technological options to ensure the CWC's integrity
- **Proven track record**

# The power of universality

- Quasi-universal disarmament treaty
  - 188 States Parties
  - 8 non-States Parties
    - Second only to the NPT ( $\Rightarrow$  189 States Parties)
- In the Middle East
  - 18 States Parties
    - Number includes Sudan, Turkey, Mauretania, etc.
  - 4 non-States Parties
    - Egypt, Israel, South Sudan, Syria

# Or not so obvious as starting point ...

- Asymmetric capacities in the Middle East
  - Only Syria with a confirmed CW stockpile & doctrine
  - Different weapon categories perform similar doctrinal functions
    - Existential survival ⇒ Israel NW / Syria CW
- Political imperatives
  - e.g., Egypt's participation in CWC/BTWC linked to Israel's joining the NPT
- Realities on the ground
  - Political and social upheavals in ME not conducive to meeting disarmament obligations
    - Not just question of joining, also question of qualitative implementation


# Verification challenges for the ME

- Is the intrusiveness of the CWC verification machinery currently acceptable to the ME non-Parties?
- Is present treaty focus on CW destruction verification the most relevant goal for ME disarmament?
- Is the verification of the prevention of future CW armament sufficiently developed to meet ME security concerns?
- What about the fact that the ‘challenge inspection’ has never been utilised?

# Definition of a CW

- The CWC definition of a CW serves the treaty
  - Sets the boundaries for declarations and verification procedures (incl. inspections)
  - For practical purposes: three schedules
    - Some argue that the 3 schedules is all what the CWC is about, despite the GPC
    - If unchallenged, then CWC will only be effective with regard to past chemical warfare agents and their precursors, and be irrelevant regarding future developments
- Perceptions of nature CW on the ground may be quite different from legal definition
  - Also implications for setting boundaries around 'delivery systems'

# Defining a chemical weapon



# Concluding thoughts

- CWC is a most useful instrument, but perhaps not the best one in the opening phases of the ME process
  - Complex processes  $\Leftrightarrow$  primary security expectations
  - CW elimination (Syria) may occur irrespective of CWC
    - Could Israel then ratify the CWC?
    - Would Egypt's position on the NPT—CWC linkage isolate it?
  - CWC itself has entered a period of transition
- Nevertheless, as part of the ME process, states can put in place a number of procedures in line with the CWC as part of CSB process
  - Statements & declarations to remove opacity
  - Adopting managed access procedures
  - Setting up a national authority as focal point
  - Multi-stakeholder interactions
- At later stages of the ME process, the CWC can become an powerful norm enforces and provider of additional security guarantees



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