Designing *Nuclear Weapon* Disarmament

Verification Insights from the Chemical Weapons Convention

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What does ‘disarmament’ entail?

• Comprehensive prohibition on the (research?), development, acquisition, possession and use of a discrete weapon category
  – Zero: no residual stockpiles allowed (e.g., for deterrence)
  – **Backward dimension**: destruction of existing weapon holdings
  – **Forward dimension**: prevention of future armament

• Equal rights and obligations for all States Parties
  – Balance between disarmament and development ⇐ Universalisation
  – Security guarantees (defence, protection, assistance)

• Mechanisms to enhance transparency and ensure compliance with treaty provisions
  – International, treaty specific organisation with own inspectorate
  – Shared responsibilities between IO and States Parties (national authority)
  – Domestic legislation for verification implementation
What do you wish to verify?

- **Weapon destruction**
  - Warheads + fissile materials
  - Delivery systems ⇒ will require demarcation (what is specific to NW?)
  - Specifically designed equipment for use with weapons

- **Facilities and installations**
  - Storage and launch sites
  - Research & production facilities
  - Testing sites
  - Any other elements to ensure termination of the weapon programmes
  - Conversion of facilities to peaceful uses ⇒ may require special verification provisions

- **Non-military nuclear activities worldwide**
  - Essential for prevention of future armament
  - Universalisation principle
  - Not just transfer of fissile materials
Scope of verification

• **Scope of treaty**
  – State weapon programmes?
  – Non-state actor activities (terrorism; crime)?

• **CWC approach**
  – Focus on state-run weapon programmes
  – Recognition of potential role of private industry in CW armament
  – Terrorism and crime are State Party responsibility
    • Domestication of international prohibitions and obligations
    • Domestic criminal and penal legislation (+ other regulations, e.g., technology transfer controls)
      – Covers *all* activities by *any* natural or legal person on territory of State Party
      – Principle of extra-territoriality applied to own nationals

• **Clarity of definitions**
  – Precise, treaty-specific definitions required to organise verification
  – Certain terms (e.g., terrorism) impossible to define internationally
    • Added reason for shared responsibility between IO and State party
CWC: organisation of compliance

• **OPCW**
  – International organisation overseeing implementation of and compliance with *all* treaty articles
  – Has *autonomous responsibility* for detecting non-compliance and restoring compliance

• **Mechanisms to:**
  – Generate transparency ⇒ declarations + inspections
    • States parties must declare all past and present CW-related activities within treaty-specified parameters
    • Any unreported or erroneously reported activity is violation of CWC (but not necessarily deliberate)
  – Address anomalies
    • Consultations
    • Clarification requests
    • Challenge inspections
    • Investigation of alleged use of CW
Enforcing compliance

- **Measures to be taken by OPCW EC and CSP**
  - Unspecified; the CWC only offers some recommendations without imposing limitations
  - May include sanctions (to be determined)
  - Throughout the process, the engaged or challenged State Party retains rights that preserve the integrity of the CWC process
  - A state cannot be denied membership of the OPCW

- **Reporting non-compliance to UNGA and UNSC**
  - Can (*not: must*) be done by either EC or CSP
  - Conscious & autonomous decision rather than automatic requirement
    - P5 will be on board
    - Most likely outcome: endorsement of decisions by OPCW bodies, resulting in their enhanced authority as regards State Party with compliance concerns
Added complications since 1990s

- **Paradigm shift from disarmament to non-proliferation**
  - Focus shift from weapon elimination to prevention of capability building
    - Technology rather than the weapon itself becomes central concern
    - Potential possessor rather than the weapon becomes the issue
    - Impact on BTWC (Protocol) and CWC
  - Objective vs. subjective goals
    - Disarmament: goals specified in treaty and apply equally to all parties
    - Non-proliferation: Different approaches to different countries based on subjective judgment of intent
  - Non-proliferation: CBW threat can never disappear
    - Resolution of one proliferation threat does not affect other ones
    - Even if all resolved today, there is tomorrow’s threat

- **Consequences:**
  - Framing of the threat is in function of the dominant power
    - Limited consensus on nature and size of threat
    - Threat appreciation differs according to
      - View of state as global, regional, or local power
      - Acceptance of security dependency (e.g., participation in security alliances)
    - Different perceptions of urgency to take measures and nature of those measures
  - ‘Traditional’ verification mechanisms no longer seen as adequate
Some thoughts on the CWC

• Preference is clearly for resolving anomalies at the lowest level of confrontation
  – Through its implementation, the CWC has become a cooperative regime
  – Intrusive tools were designed in great detail (Cold War), but have never been used
  – Inclusion of those intrusive tools have arguably been instrumental, even crucial to achieve the cooperative atmosphere

• Challenges remain
  – Changes in the nature of the verification requirements after CW destruction has been completed
    • Mostly affects the future organisation of routine verification of industry and trade
  – In verification, ultimate decisions always remain political even if the inspection process is to a large extent shielded from political interference
    • e.g., what if a challenge inspection confirms only marginal non-compliance?
Nuclear weapons: Where to start?

• Fundamental research into the role of arms control and disarmament in an evolving security environment
  – What is its purpose?
    • Recovery of the arms control / disarmament paradigm
  – What can it achieve?
  – What are the preconditions for success?
  – How do we incorporate global and regional dimensions of security?

• With regard to future disarmament
  – Reinstitution of traditional functions of verification in disarmament
    • Focus on weapons and weapon-related programmes
    • Reconnect underlying technologies with the weapon rather than the possessor
  – Development of new tools and procedures for verification
    • Greater appreciation of the intangible nature of much of the technology involved
    • Focus on the generation of transparency
    • Actively involve larger number of actors (incl. industry & science community, civil society)
  – Restoration of the principle of non-exceptionalism

• Transparency is critical in communicating purpose
  – Complexities in interpreting purpose of many activities and technologies are central to difficulties concerning future disarmament
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