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APOME workshop:

*Tackling the Middle East WMD/DVs Arsenals in the Context of Military Asymmetries Towards Zonal Disarmament*

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**THE POTENTIAL FOR CONFIDENCE-BUILDING IN THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS AREA IN THE MIDDLE EAST**
Centrality of the CWC

- CWC has elaborate verification machinery
  - OPCW as implementing organisation with Technical Secretariat
  - Division of labour between OPCW and individual State Party
    - State Party – via National Authority – submits *declarations*
    - Technical Secretariat
      - Analyses national declarations and addresses anomalies
      - Conducts inspections (CW destruction, industry, government facilities)
      - Investigates compliance concerns if so requested
      - Investigates allegations of use

- Verification regime is a declaration-based system
  - The national collection of relevant data and their submission to the OPCW is an *obligation*
  - CBMs, as in BTWC, are less relevant to CWC functioning
Possible utility of CW-related CBMs in the Middle East

- Always need to bear in mind that only two states in the region are not party to the CWC
  - Egypt & Israel

- Measures to enhance regional security and stability

- National initiatives towards building confidence
Measures to enhance regional security and stability

- **Prenuptials**: prior to CWC opening for signature many states in regional security complexes signed regional agreements not to use CW against each other, not acquire or retain CW, and committed themselves to joining the CWC
  - USA – USSR: *Memorandum of Understanding Regarding A Bilateral Verification Experiment and Data Exchange Related to Prohibition of Chemical Weapons* (23 September 1989)
  - Argentina, Brazil and Chili + later Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay and Uruguay: *Joint Declaration on the Complete Prohibition of Chemical and Biological Weapons* (Mendoza Agreement, 5 September 1991)
  - Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela: *Declaration on the Renunciation of Weapons of Mass Destruction* (Andean Declaration, 4 December 1991)
  - Southeast Asia and Oceania (21 countries): Statement issued by participating States at the conclusion of the Third Chemical Weapons Regional Seminar, held in Sydney, Australia, from 21 to 23 June 1992
  - India and Pakistan: *Joint Declaration on Complete Prohibition of Chemical Weapons* (19 August 1992)

- **Non-aggression pact among the negotiating partners**
  - May not prevent altercations among the negotiating parties, but could erect sufficient barriers to prevent them from sliding into armed conflicts.
  - Very specifically, such a pact should include a CW no-use pledge
National confidence-building steps by Egypt and Israel

- A unilateral renunciation of chemical warfare under any circumstances.
- A unilateral pledge not to engage in the development, production or any other form of acquisition and retention of CW.
- A statement on when the country ceased offensive chemical warfare activities and CW development and production.
  - It could accompany such a statement with a brief description of past CW activities.
- Voluntary national statements on the nature of chemical research and development activities in the country, as well as statements on the production of chemicals for peaceful purposes that could have potential use for CW production.
  - Both countries could model those declarations after the CWC requirements.
- A national statement on the types of chemical defence activities.
- Promulgation of national legislation (or supplementing any existing legislation) that prohibits any natural or legal person operating on its territory from engaging in any form of activity that contributes towards chemical weapon development and production, as well as assisting anybody else inside or outside the country with CW acquisition.
- In a second phase, each state could conduct some national inspections in accordance with the CWC procedures and publicise the results of the exercise.
- In a third phase, Egypt and Israel might engage in a bilateral transparency-enhancement process similar to the steps in the US–Soviet MoU of 1989.
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