Biological Weapons Convention

Article VII:
Preparing for operationalisation

Jean Pascal Zanders
Political Affairs Officer
United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), Geneva

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Realities of the BWC

- **Treaty is governed by the community of States Parties**
  - No formal international organisation to oversee treaty implementation
  - No legal person with contracting authority

- **No capacity to prepare for contingencies in case of major treaty violations**
  - No equivalent provision to Article X of the CWC
    - Was foreseen in Article 13 of the draft legally binding Protocol (2001)
  - No systematic (national) capacity building in surveillance, detection, diagnostics, treatment, etc. (as could be conceived under Article X of the BWC)
  - No prepositioned equipment and supplies or systematic (regional) training programmes
  - No independent investigative capacity
  - No international network of certified reference laboratories to analyse samples or with forensic capacities
Pathways for implementing BWC Article VII

- **Development of independent capacities**
  - Full complement of capacities (e.g. CWC model)
  - Partial capacities to address specific BWC needs, e.g.
    - Network of (certified by whom?) national laboratories to analyse samples; forensic investigations
    - Training and maintenance of teams of investigators
    - Logistical pre-planning to launch and support operations in zones of armed conflict
  - **Problems**: No political will for institution building, legal issues, sustainability of required preparedness levels, credibility of investigative process, etc.

- **Reliance on the United Nations**
  - UN Secretary-General’s Mechanism to investigate allegations of BW use
  - Has expertise with organisation and delivery of emergency assistance under difficult circumstances, including armed conflict
  - Capacities to assess risks in areas of operation (UNDSS), negotiate access of investigators/relief workers with Member States
  - Has legal authority to conclude agreements or enter into contracts
  - **Problems**: Politicisation of decision-making processes in UN Security Council, reliance on national rosters of experts (who have limited expertise in working as a team), no independent network of laboratories, no equivalent OPCW capacities

- **Reliance on other international organisations**
  - E.g. WHO, FOA, OIE, IPPC ...
  - **Advantages**: advanced capacities for dealing with disease outbreaks
  - **Problems**: Capacities and operational procedures not specifically designed for demands posed by deliberate disease
Preparing for operationalisation

- Developing regional and local capacities to receive emergency assistance
  - Could be undertaken as part of (national) health preparedness initiatives
  - Opportunities for cooperation under Article X of the BTWC

- Adoption of procedures / guidelines for invoking Article VII
  - How does a BWC State Party trigger Article VII?
  - To whom should an Article VII request be directed?
  - What are the responsibilities of the other States Parties after Article VII has been invoked?

- Establishment of procedures for requesting international assistance, including from international organisations
  - Is there a need for an investigation of alleged use to validate the Article VII request?
    - If not, what is the use of going through the BTWC? How does one avoid false claims?
  - Who will request assistance?
    - UNSC (mentioned in Article VII) or individual States Parties?
    - To whom?
  - Which duties do individual States Parties have with regard to emergency assistance?
    - “undertakes to provide or support assistance” = promise, not obligation

- Organisation and delivery of emergency assistance
An additional layer of considerations

Which type of crisis would be considered under Article VII?
- In principle, all deliberate outbreaks involving human, animal or plant pathogens
- However, impact of media and subjective sense of urgency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The outbreak</th>
<th>Human pathogens</th>
<th>Non-human pathogens</th>
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| Fast spreading epidemic | Ebola crisis  
Mentioned in Final Document 8th RevCon, §34 | Foot-and-mouth disease Blight |
| Slowly developing crisis | Anthrax outbreak | Anthrax outbreak  
(e.g., livestock)  
*Thrips palmi?* |
Developing regional and local capacities to receive emergency assistance

**Principles**

- National preparedness & capacities contribute directly to international capabilities for response, investigation & mitigation of disease outbreaks
- National preparedness *should not be imposed* as a precondition for either provision of receipt of assistance
- Encouragement to assist with building relevant capacity upon request in view of differences in development and national capacities & resources among States Parties
- Relevancy of IHR to building necessary capacities
- Building capacity to recover as quickly as possible from deliberate disease
- Article VII database to facilitate assistance

(Note: **Black text** = review conference documents; **Red text** = national suggestions)

**Actions**

- Based on assessment of national capacities, BWC States Parties can more clearly identify assistance needs
- Capacity building at national and international levels = most immediate imperative to enhance capacities to promptly & effectively detect and respond to BW use / threat of use
- National & joint efforts to improve disease surveillance & detection & capacities to confirm outbreak causes, as well as abilities to build capacities for other States Parties
- Training courses (UNSG mechanism; deployment with UN teams)
- Global public health capacity building & training
- Development & funding of national/regional resilience strategies & capacities (may be in collaboration with regional organisations)
- Database via ISU website: matching requests & offers for Article VII assistance
- Establishment of a voluntary fund for Article VII
Adoption of procedures / guidelines for invoking Article VII

**Principles**

- Only relevant if outbreak is deliberate
- Working Paper (8thRevCon) outlining elements for the application of assistance (RSA)
  - Request to UNSC
  - Recognises that there is no determination of whether an investigation should precede UNSC decision
  - Recognises option for States Parties to request assistance from international organisations or other States Parties without invoking Article VII
  - Offers template for information to be included in request to UNSC.

**Actions**
Establishment procedures for requesting international assistance, including from international organisations

**Principles**

- Possible coordination role for UN in providing & delivering assistance
- Roles under respective mandates for WHO, OIE, FAO, IPPC
- UN and international organisations could play important role in coordinating, mobilising & delivering support and assistance
- Emergency assistance can be provided by States Parties pending decision by the UNSC
- No duplication in BWC context of programmes and activities by other organisations, initiatives or arrangements
- No comprehensive Protocol; no dedicated international organisation
- Review of whether existing modalities of international response allow for timely and adequate support and assistance to the affected countries and peoples including first responders and health care workers; the preventive, preparedness, response and recovery activities at the national, regional and international level

**Actions**

- Challenges for developing effective measures
- Challenges on level of coordination for providing appropriate assistance
- Need for information of types of assistance that might be available
- Support for UNSG Mechanism
Organisation and delivery of emergency assistance

**Principles**

- Nature of assistance: detection equipment, including biosensors, alarm equipment, protective equipment, decontamination equipment and decontaminants, prophylactic; diagnostic and therapeutic medical measures and materials and associated equipment and exchange of information and technology regarding assistance
- Assistance strictly humanitarian

**Actions**

- 2mn doses of smallpox vaccine made available via WHO (GER)
- Offer of biomedical units to deliver protection against biological weapons, investigate their alleged use, and to suppress epidemics of various aetiology (RUS)
Conclusions

- **Debate on Article VII is still in early conceptual stage**
  - Formulation of broad principles
  - Emphasis on the humanitarian dimension
  - Need for clarification of terminology in Article VII, as intent was different during negotiation of BWC
  - Review of status implementation of Article VII (BWC/CONF.VIII/INF.3) contains primarily national activities whose goals were reinterpreted in function of Article VII

- **Major gaps**
  - No common idea of how a state might decide to invoke Article VII or how such a state should proceed
  - Major gap analysis is required to understand the demands of implementing Article VII in all its stages
    - Relationship States Parties – UNSC requires clarification, including its political and organisational dimensions
    - Is prior determination of deliberate disease a prerequisite for invoking Article VII and UNSC action?
  - In particular, it is necessary to clarify the additional benefits to States Parties for invoking Article VII over existing mechanisms
    - There are clear disadvantages
Contact

Jean Pascal Zanders
Political Affairs Officer
UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (Geneva Branch)
Room C.1-1, Palais des Nations, CH-1211 Geneva 10

Tel: +41 (0)22 917 4460
Mob: +41 (0)76 691 0585
Fax: +41 (0) 22 917 04 83
jzanders@unog.ch