The EU P2P Export Control Programme is managed by the European Commission’s Directorate General (DG) for International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO) and the European External Action Service (EEAS).
Designing a Master Course on CBRN Dual-Use Technology Transfer Controls

Introduction

Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) weapons belong to the category of non-conventional arms. The characterisation as ‘non-conventional’ refers to the fact that in all countries, irrespective of their political system, the highest political authorities must authorise the release of these weapons for use in armed conflict. ‘Conventional’ equally means that the use of such weapons has been pre-delegated to lower levels of command.

In contrast to conventional weaponry, there exists no arms trade in non-conventional arms. The preferred term used with reference to non-conventional weapons is ‘proliferation’. Its original meaning is derived from cell biology: a rapid and repeated, sometimes uncontrolled growth of cells like, for example, in cancer. The connotation is negative; it suggests threat. In view of the absence of trade in ready-to-use CBRN weapons, the uncontrolled transfer of underlying technologies is the primary cause of concern. The concern applies to state and non-state actors alike. The transfers patterns may be domestic or trans-national. Most technologies have legitimate purposes, often unrelated to weapon acquisition processes, but many can easily be adapted to serve the pursuit of CBRN capacities. Furthermore, proliferation may involve the transfer of certain technology types that are way down the weapon acquisition process, meaning that without broader knowledge of the dynamic, a supplier would never suspect that a particular sale has malicious finality.

Conscious of the problematic the European Commission finances two parallel Targeted Initiatives on ‘Export Controls of Dual-Use Materials and Technologies’ whose implementation has been entrusted to the International Science and Technology Centre (ISTC) and the Science and Technology Centre in Ukraine (STCU). ISTC, located in Astana, targets Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Armenia, Georgia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Mongolia), whereas the Kyiv-based STCU serves the GUAM countries (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova).

One of the key work packages involves the development of a university course on CBRN dual-use technology transfer controls.

Designing the course

The Targeted Initiatives identified government officials, universities and academia as the key customers for the university course. The three groups, however, comprise many different types of professional expertise and experiences. Based on the findings by the Advisory Board on Education and Outreach (ABEO) of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), it was also clear that the target audiences need to discover for themselves what the issues are, how they affect their work, and, as a consequence, why they should be seized by the issue. This process, in and of itself, is already a major educational process. Furthermore, educational activities have shown that each of the professional categories may have awareness of specific issues relevant to their work domain, but lack insight that colleagues and partners may face similar issues in different contexts. The course conse-
quent has to be not just multi-disciplinary, but also cross-disciplinary.

A second dimension that immediately came to the fore was that the university course had to fit a variety of educational situations. Government people might want to obtain a certificate of attainment within the shortest time frame; universities might prefer to integrate the technology transfer controls in broader educational programmes, such as economics, international law, science education, political science, and so on. University students could be interested in certain aspects of the course and therefore have a preference to study those aspects as part of an elective course.

In the early stages of the project both ISTC and STCU identified academic institutions as potential partners in the project, and cooperation was quickly established with KAZGUU University in Astana and the Taras Schevchenko National University, Faculty of Economics in Kyiv. In view of the aim to offer the university course to other partnering countries of respectively ISTC and STCU, early discussions indicated the need for flexibility informed by local legal and administrative demands, as well as the universities’ primary student populations.

To maximise flexibility, an early decision was taken to offer the full university master programme as a set of modules that could be offered both as a standalone master course or as components to be integrated into already existing university offerings. In the latter case, the university would have the option to make the modules mandatory (e.g., as part of specialisation) or to offer them as elective courses. Professionals (e.g. government functionaries) could take all modules and be rewarded with a certificate of attainment after fulfilling all requirements.

Identifying the issue areas

Mind mapping technology helped with the identification of the issue areas central to the envisaged university course and establishing links between them. The following main branches in the mind map came to the fore:

1. Basic knowledge about the CBRN spectrum and core concepts in transfer controls;
2. Core knowledge about the concept of ‘technology’ and ‘dual-use technologies’;
3. International legal and regulatory frameworks governing CBRN-related dual-use technologies;
4. Understanding of the responsibilities of states, institutions and individuals in the prevention of misuse of technology;
5. Threats and risks related to dual-use technologies;
6. Education and outreach with regard to the prevention of the misuse of dual-use technologies;
7. Dynamics of transfer controls, the roles of different professional and actor categories, and resources for information on laws, regulations, and implementing agencies; and
8. Economic relationships, covering domestic and international partners and technology transfer patterns.
Based on these insights, the current master course outline proposes nine modules: two introductory ones, four substantive ones, and three seminar modules that will focus on practical dimensions.

**Next steps**

At the time of writing detailed discussions about the respective curricula are ongoing with both KAZGUU and Taras Shevchenko National University in view of their adaptation to local requirements so that the degrees can become nationally and internationally recognised.

Current planning envisages the test-teaching at both institutions of some module elements in the spring of 2019 and, provided all legal and administrative requirements have been met, introduction of the full course during the second semester of 2019.

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**ATT and COARM Trade Control News**

**Revision of the EU Strategy on SALW**

*13 June, 2018, Brussels*

On 13 June 2018, the High Representative and the Commission adopted a Joint Communication proposing elements for a comprehensive EU Strategy against illicit firearms and Small Arms and Light weapons (SALW). Illicit weapons are contributing to global terrorism and conflicts, thwarting the EU’s development, humanitarian and stabilisation efforts in parts of the EU’s neighbourhood and Africa. Within the European Union, illicit firearms are fueling organised crime and amplifying the impact of terrorist attacks. A broad range of governmental agencies, including police, customs, border guards, armed forces, export control and judicial authorities are required to act in a more integrated manner to tackle such transnational threats. The Joint Communication aims to guide collective EU action inside the EU and abroad, to prevent and curb the illicit acquisition of firearms by terrorists, criminals and other unauthorised actors, as well as to promote accountability and responsibility with regard to the legal arms trade. The Communication proposed for the new Strategy takes into account the evolving security context and relevant elements, such as the growing threat of terrorism inside the EU, technological and legislative developments. It entails a set of actions to be taken at national, regional and international level and would replace the one that was adopted by the European Council in 2005. The Communication is currently being considered by the Council with a view to the adoption of a new EU Strategy.

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