Biological Weapons Disarmament Reaches 50
Fifty years ago, on 26 March 1975, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction entered into force. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) was the first multilateral treaty to outlaw a discrete weaponry category comprehensively. No party to the treaty can develop, produce, otherwise acquire, or retain biological and toxin weapons. Nor can state parties use such weapons in any way or under any circumstances. On its 50th anniversary, 188 states are party to the BTWC. Only nine are on the outside. Four signed the convention (between 1972 and 1975), but they must still ratify it: Egypt, Haiti, Somalia and Syria. Five are non-signatories: Chad, Djibouti, Eritrea, Israel and Kiribati.
Serious challenges
Despite this success, the BTWC faces some serious challenges, including allegations of illicit biological weapon (BW) programmes and other types of violations or non-compliance. Over the past fifteen years, it has had to stand up against various hybrid threats, including disinformation campaigns delegitimising international cooperation in the life sciences, biorisk management or defence and protection against natural, accidental or deliberate disease threats. In addition, lawfare strategies aim to undermine international trust in the treaty and international institutions such as the United Nations by using treaty provisions and procedural rules to sow doubt and undermine scientifically established facts.
Advancements in the life sciences and biotechnologies augment the planet’s health, food and environmental security. The convergences of the life sciences and biotechnologies with other disciplines, including chemistry, physics, mathematics, computation and informatics, nanoscience, engineering, etc., reinforce and propel progress. Unfortunately, they may also set up new pathways for the design, development, and production of new or enhanced pathogens and toxins, as well as their delivery systems. History is replete with examples of laws and regulations failing to keep up or anticipate social, scientific and technological transformations. The challenge for the community of BTWC state parties is not just to upgrade or expand the treaty but to foster and nourish a governance model in which the diverse national and international stakeholder communities contribute to upholding the core norm embodied in the BTWC: to never under any circumstances acquire or use biological or toxin agents.
Evolution
The BTWC is a short treaty, a mere five pages long. The principal reason is that the BTWC lacks verification tools and, consequently, did not provide for an international organisation to oversee treaty implementation. The inability to verify claims of non-compliance, inspect facilities, or investigate allegations of BW use makes the treaty intrinsically weak. Without an organisation, there are no formally identified decision-making bodies with responsibilities for advancing the disarmament objectives, assessing the diverse challenges to the treaty, or taking action whenever required.
Any foreseen follow-on activity after the treaty’s entry into force was limited to a (single) review conference after five years (Article XII). With their decision at the first review conference in 1980 to convene another one in 1986, the state parties set the quinquennial review process in motion. They began identifying and deciding on specific activities during the intervening years. The actions included the development of confidence-building measures (CBM), the identification of the possible verification measures (the VEREX exercise), and the (unsuccessful) negotiation in the Ad Hoc Group of a legally binding protocol that sought to set up an international organisation and foresaw elements of a verification system.
After the failure of these negotiations (and the fifth review conference) in 2001, the state parties regrouped and embarked on a series of annual meetings of experts (MX) and state parties (MSP) in between review conferences. These have focussed primarily on improved implementation of the various treaty provisions and contributed to expanded agreements and common understandings. In turn, these outcomes have promoted concrete action programmes and stimulated international cooperation and assistance to prevent BW acquisition or use, advanced effective national legislation and regulations, addressed emergencies resulting from BW use, stimulated legitimate research and biotechnology development, and supported the implementation of biosecurity and -safety measures. UN Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) meanwhile addresses terrorist threats and similarly promotes the promulgation of national regulatory measures. To assist with the increased number of activities, the sixth review conference (2006) decided on establishing an Implementation Support Unit, which over the years has considerably improved the quality of state party activities in areas such as treaty universalisation, regional and national capacity building, and collection of annual CBM returns.
The current inter-sessional period involved the establishment of a Working Group on the Strengthening of the Biological Weapons Convention, which addresses several topics with a view of concrete decisions at the tenth review conference (2027) or an earlier Special Conference if a majority of state parties so request. Among the possible outcomes are creating a mechanism to review science and technology developments, the operationalisation of databases supporting international cooperation and emergency assistance, renewed exploration of verification tools and ways to institutionally strengthen the BTWC, enhanced compliance, and more structured international cooperation for peaceful purposes.
Why is the BTWC still a strong treaty?
One positive, perhaps unanticipated outcome of the MX and MSP sessions has been the emergence of overlapping cooperation networks in support of the BW norm against and the prevention of deliberate disease. The intersessional series of activities brought in representatives from organisations as diverse as the World Health Organisation, Food and Agricultural Organisation and the World Organisation for Animal Health, Interpol, the World Trade Organisation and the World Customs Organisation, United Nations agencies concerned with disarmament, environmental protection and development, treaty-specific disarmament organisations, multi- and transnational companies, research institutes, etc., into the debates on strengthening the BTWC. The meetings also expanded the number of participating non-governmental organisations and contributed to the professionalisation and specialisation of their input. Today, a wide range of actors participate in or contribute to the functions of disarmament because they have assumed individual or organisational responsibilities to prevent the misuse of the tools, processes and products of the life sciences and biotechnologies. Their collaboration has also widened from initially state agencies to international organisations, civil society constituencies, professional and scientific associations, and even individuals.
Seeing a dynamic future for the BTWC
These evolutions illustrate the growing appreciation that the prevention of BW lies not just with a single treaty. It has become a shared responsibility of all.
However, the many institutions, agencies, companies, and professions still need to expand their comfort zones to work together, share information, and integrate activities where possible. Bureaucratic resistance, different membership, or the stakes of varied state agencies in the functioning of the various international organisations may remain significant impediments. The same applies to interactions among the scientific and professional communities, industry, and civil society constituencies and their interactions with governments and intergovernmental organisations.
There is still a long and arduous road ahead. Yet, its very weaknesses are transforming the BTWC into a laboratory for the future governance of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation based on multi-stakeholdership and functional specialisation between governments and other stakeholders.
