Response is failure in the primary mission of preventing CBW
The Global Partnership against the Spread of Materials and Weapons of Mass Destruction has now been around for over two decades. In the wake of the terrorist attacks against the US in September 2001, it started out as an effort to mobilise the resources of the G8 members to prevent terrorist acquisition of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and related materials. The weapons, technologies and skills available from the former Soviet Union presented a significant proliferation risk, which the US was already addressing through the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programme. Now comprising 31 members, the Global Partnership (GP) played a …
Falling between the Cracks and by the Sides
Next month, Essentials of Biological Security: A Global Perspective edited by Lijun Shang, Weiwen Zhang and Malcolm Dando will be published. The book offers an introduction to biological security and the chemical and biological weapons (CBW) threat spectrum and explores the history of biological weapons from antiquity to modern day. Its core comprises expert analyses of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and other relevant international agreements and organisations and practical discussions of dual-use technologies and how to minimise their risk. (For a preview of the book contents, click here.) I contributed the chapter Falling between the Cracks and by …
Russia’s apoplexy over biological research – Implications for the BTWC and its Articles V and VI
Since the summer, Russia has been adding chapters to the history of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) with its allegations of treaty violations against Ukraine and the USA. So far, it has culminated in convening a Formal Consultative Committee (FCM) under BTWC Article V in September and filing an Article VI complaint accompanied by a draft resolution proposing an investigative commission with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in October. The FCM was inconclusive because states parties reached no consensus on whether Moscow’s allegations have merit. Notwithstanding, a large majority of participating states rejected the accusations in their …
Biological weapon monitoring in Iraq
Introduction to Historical Notes, Issue #4 The fourth issue of the Historical Notes series was prepared by Dr Gabriele Kraatz-Wadsack. She was a weapons inspector with the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) in Iraq, later Chief of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch – UN Office for Disarmament Affairs. She also served in the German Armed Forces and the Federal Foreign Office. In this fourth issue of Historical Notes, she describes the only instance of international monitoring in the biological weapons (BW) area. It draws on her first-hand experience to launch and manage biological ongoing monitoring in Iraq from 1995 through …
The Retort: Evolving CBW disarmament challenges
Dr Brett Edwards (Lecturer, University of Bath) and Professor Lijun Shang (School of Human Sciences, Metropolitan University London) are collaborating on The Retort, a new series of educational video recordings via YouTube on chemical and biological weapons (CBW), their disarmament, and the evolving threats they still pose. The recordings aim to give the public a general understanding of issues ahead of the review conferences of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (28 November – 16 December 2022) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (May 2023). For each video recording, the intiative takers invite an expert in the field. So far, three …
Reflections of a negotiator on the BTWC Ad Hoc Group
Introduction to Historical Notes, Issue #3 The third issue of the Historical Notes series was prepared by Dr Robert (Bob) J. Mathews. From 1984 until 2017, he served as Scientific Adviser to Australian delegations during the negotiation and implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and efforts to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). In this third issue of Historical Notes, he reviews the efforts undertaken by the states parties to the BTWC to equip the convention with verification tools and set up an international organisation to oversee its implementation. As soon as the treaty negotiations came to …
OPCW: 26th Session of the Conference of the States Parties (CSP-26)
I am pleased to present here the summary of the annual OPCW Conference of States Parties, prepared by Leanne Quinn of the CWC Coalition. The Trench is a member of the CWC Coalition. Jean Pascal Summary Report by Leanne Quinn Program Assistant, Chemical Weapons Convention Coalition (Cross-posted from the CWC Coalition Conference summaries) During the annual Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), representatives from all the States Parties to the CWC convene in The Hague to oversee the implementation of the CWC, promote the goals and obligations of the treaty, and review treaty compliance, among …
Trying to picture a treaty for a Middle East Zone free of non-conventional weaponry
On 30 November, the Middle East Treaty Organisation (METO) – a coalition of civil society activists and practitioners – organised an informal virtual discussion round with Middle Eastern diplomats participating in the Second Session of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction under the auspices of the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs. That session should have taken place last year, but the COVID-19 pandemic forced postponement of in-person UN diplomatic gatherings. Last Tuesday’s informal discussion forms part of METO’s efforts to draft and promote a treaty for …
Constructive ambiguity, or the insertion of science review in the CWC
(Science and technology review under the BTWC, Part 2) Comparing the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is a useful exercise for imagining what could have been, especially for the former relative to the latter. Completion of negotiations lies 21 years apart. What became possible by 1992 was simply not an option in 1971. The cold war had ended; the 1987 US-USSR Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty paved the way for onsite inspections; and an eight-year war between Iran and Iraq had seen widespread chemical weapon (CW) use on battlefields, against civilians and for genocidal …
‘Within the next 5 to 10 years, it would probably be possible…’
(Science and technology review under the BTWC, Part 1) The next series of Meetings of Experts (MX) of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) is due to take place between 30 August and 8 September, a year later than originally scheduled because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Of course, provided there is no fresh resurgence in the number of infections forcing fresh meeting and travel restrictions. If the MXs proceed as planned (albeit with reduced in-person attendance), the Meeting of States Parties (MSP) will likely convene before the end of the year. The pandemic has also pushed back the 9th …