Evidence Poisoning: The OSINT Crisis Nobody Is Ready For
Over the past decade and a half, we have been confronted with chemical warfare, assassination operations involving nerve agents and lethal animal toxins, and accusations of illicit biological research activities, all indicative of serious breaches of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). The incidents were accompanied by information warfare, typically of the type in which one side claimed the allegations were fake and the other side argued their veracity. A characteristic of this information warfare is that the same antagonists – government outlets, organisations and institutions, individual scientists or academics, and motley groups …
A very thin gruel, indeed
On 23 September, President Donald Trump addressed the UN General Assembly (UNGA). In an unexpected move, he called on the world’s nations to halt the development of biological weapons (BW). Referring to the COVID pandemic five years earlier and reckless laboratory experiments, he announced a US-led international effort to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), and proposed an artificial intelligence (AI)-driven verification system. After more than two decades of opposition, his speech seemed to indicate that Washington might embrace verification machinery for the BTWC. However, the less than two minutes he devoted to the topic contained little substance …
Biological weapons: Kazakhstan’s proposal for an international organisation five years later
On 23 September 2020, amid the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) pandemic, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev of Kazakhstan addressed the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and advanced the establishment of an International Agency for Biosafety (IABS). Just over five years later, on 14 October 2025, the Kazakh Ministry for Foreign Affairs organised a one-day seminar in Almaty. Its title: 50th Anniversary of the BTWC: From Commitment to Action – the International Agency for Biological Security (IABS) initiative. The timing of the seminar was perfect. At the start of the month, the Chairperson of the Working Group (WG) on the Strengthening …
Challenges to the BTWC and CWC and questions for the Pugwash CBW Working Group
The Pugwash Chemical and Biological Weapons Working Group (CBW WG) held its first virtual event on 3 October 2025. The primary objective was to gather feedback on potential topics for the WG’s development, thereby gaining a deeper understanding of the WG’s specific role in the current academic and civil society landscape. Registrants completed a small questionnaire covering both topics. Seventy-five persons from all continents, including the Middle East and North Africa, participated. Summary Jean Pascal Zanders and Lizeka Tandwa opened the meeting. Götz Neuneck, Chairperson of the Council, introduced Pugwash, its history, current activities and working methodologies. Richard Guthrie (Pugwash …
Aiming for a future verification system for the BTWC
This posting is based on comments made during a panel on ‘The Future of Biological Weapons’ at the annual conference of the EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium, held in Brussels on 13 November 2024. Previously 1996 was a year of optimism. Held between the opening for signature (January 1993) and entry into force (April 1997) of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Fourth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) decided to give the Ad Hoc Group (AHG) a mandate to negotiate a legally binding protocol to equip the BTWC with, among other things, a verification …
Verification and Transparency: Learning from Project Coast
Introduction to Historical Notes, Issue #5 The fifth issue of the Historical Notes series was prepared by Professor Brian Rappert, Ms Lizeka Tandwa and Dr Chandré Gould. The South African Defence Force (SADF) established a top-secret chemical and biological weapon (CBW) programme code-named ‘Project Coast’ that operated between 1981 and 1995. Its primary aims were to develop a defensive capability for the SADF and weaponise chemical agents for crowd control, specifically during protests, and for the targeted assassinations of political activists in and outside of South Africa. The history and motives of this CBW programme, as far as it can …
Russia’s apoplexy over biological research – Implications for the BTWC and its Articles V and VI
Since the summer, Russia has been adding chapters to the history of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) with its allegations of treaty violations against Ukraine and the USA. So far, it has culminated in convening a Formal Consultative Committee (FCM) under BTWC Article V in September and filing an Article VI complaint accompanied by a draft resolution proposing an investigative commission with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in October. The FCM was inconclusive because states parties reached no consensus on whether Moscow’s allegations have merit. Notwithstanding, a large majority of participating states rejected the accusations in their …
Biological weapon monitoring in Iraq
Introduction to Historical Notes, Issue #4 The fourth issue of the Historical Notes series was prepared by Dr Gabriele Kraatz-Wadsack. She was a weapons inspector with the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) in Iraq, later Chief of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch – UN Office for Disarmament Affairs. She also served in the German Armed Forces and the Federal Foreign Office. In this fourth issue of Historical Notes, she describes the only instance of international monitoring in the biological weapons (BW) area. It draws on her first-hand experience to launch and manage biological ongoing monitoring in Iraq from 1995 through …
Reflections of a negotiator on the BTWC Ad Hoc Group
Introduction to Historical Notes, Issue #3 The third issue of the Historical Notes series was prepared by Dr Robert (Bob) J. Mathews. From 1984 until 2017, he served as Scientific Adviser to Australian delegations during the negotiation and implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and efforts to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). In this third issue of Historical Notes, he reviews the efforts undertaken by the states parties to the BTWC to equip the convention with verification tools and set up an international organisation to oversee its implementation. As soon as the treaty negotiations came to …
Regional security and the Chemical Weapons Convention: Insights for the Middle East (Part 2)
In November 2019, the first annual meeting exploring the possibility of creating a zone exempt of non-conventional weaponry in the Middle East took place. The COVID-19 pandemic forced the postponement of the second meeting in 2020. Conditions permitting, the session is now scheduled for this autumn. Meanwhile, the conference has organised two informal workshops, the second one of which was held virtually on 23-25 February. Entitled ‘Good Practices and Lessons Learned with respect to the implementation of Treaties establishing Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones’, the workshop’s third session looked at the core obligations governing chemical and biological weapons (CBW). It aimed to glean …